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Abstract 
In 1996 the European Union adopted the Seveso II Directive. The Directive stated actions to 
be taken in the process industry in order to prevent and limit the impact of serious chemical 
accidents. In the Directive it is clearly stated that domino effects shall be considered, but the 
level of detail required is not specified. Due to that fact and the high degree of complexity 
linked to domino effects, these aspects are mostly dealt with in a qualitative manner. Such 
approach leads to subjective assessments and is highly dependent on simplified assumptions, 
leading to results that may be questionable. Thus, it would be beneficial to develop a method 
that incorporates the risk of domino effects in a quantitative risk analysis (QRA), which has 
been the aim of this thesis. The method was developed based on a literature review of existing 
research. Focus was on integrating domino effects as a natural part of a QRA without 
compromising the timeframe associated to a QRA. The developed method has been applied in 
a case study of an oil refinery in order to evaluate how well it is applicable in practise. During 
the case study, the method has proven to enable the risk of property damage with regard to 
domino effects to be quantitatively analysed. The results from the case study, evidence the 
importance of taking domino effects into consideration in QRAs, as the risk may be 
underestimated if not. 
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SUMMARY 
Domino effects in industrial installations are complex phenomenon that may cause severe 
damage on property and life if not dealt with in a sufficient manner. As chain of accidents can 
be traced back to being the cause of major accidents occurring, domino effects have lately 
been given much attention and several research projects in the field have been conducted. The 
Seveso II Directive adopted in 1996 by the European Union states that domino effects should 
be included in risk analyses for chemical plants. However, the level of detail in which domino 
effects should be dealt with in analysis has not been stated. Due to that fact and the high 
degree of complexity linked with domino effects, these aspects are mostly dealt with in a 
qualitative manner. Such approach leads to subjective assessments and is highly dependent on 
simplified assumptions, leading to results that may be questionable. The objectives of recent 
projects have mainly been to develop and validate tools for the quantification of the risk 
associated with domino effects. Looking at existing approaches for analysing domino effects 
in a quantitative way, several models are available in literature. Common for these models are 
that they treat domino scenarios in a separate analysis, starting from the results gained from a 
conventional quantitative risk analysis (QRA). These models show that domino effects 
effectively can be integrated in a QRA, but do not provide any guidance of how these effects 
should be incorporated in an analysis. Thus, there is a need for comprehensive methods that 
clearly define how domino effects effectively can be implemented and analysed within the 
boundaries of a conventional QRA framework. With this said, the aim of the thesis has been 
to develop a comprehensive method for performing QRAs with respect to domino effects and 
property damage, based on the latest research on the area. During the development of the 
method, focus has been on achieving a logic incorporation of domino effects, thus making the 
analysis manageable within the timeframe of a QRA. To ensure the functionality of the 
method, criteria for what the method should be able to deal with are defined: 
 
 The method should be applicable to well established analysis techniques and not 
dependent on complex algorithms for the analysis of the chain of events.   
 
 The method should enable a risk profile for property damage to be computed with 
regard to all accident scenarios, including potential domino scenarios.  
 
 The method should enable the risk of property damage with respect to domino effects 
to be analysed, both within a subsystem and between different subsystems.  
 
 The method should enable site specific safety distances either to be established or 
validated with regard to property damage and domino effects.   
 
The method has been applied in a case study of an oil refinery in order to evaluate how well it 
is applicable in practise; this with promising results, fulfilling the above defined criteria´s. 
During the case study, the method has proven to enable the risk of property damage with 
regard to domino effects to be quantitatively analysed. The results from the case study, 
evidence the importance of taking domino effects into consideration in QRAs, as the risk may 
be underestimated if not. During the evaluation of the method, it has been concluded that the 
chain of accidents should be delimited to only include first level of escalation. Such 
delimitation minimises the uncertainties linked to domino effects, thus making the results 
more reliable. It also enables the method to be more applicable when analysing larger 
systems, as the complexity and workload decreases. It has been concluded that computing risk 
contours with regard to property damage for all initial accident scenarios enables critical 
areas, where domino effects likely are to present themselves, to be identified in an early stage 
of the analysis. During the thesis, the need for a well established acceptance criterion with 
regard to property damage has been evidenced. 
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SAMMANFATTNING 
Dominoeffekter inom processindustrier är komplexa fenomen som kan ge upphov till 
allvarliga skador på så väl egendom som människor om de inte tas i beaktande i 
säkerhetsarbetet. Medvetenheten om fenomenet har den senaste tiden ökat och flera 
forskningsprojekt har genomförts inom området, detta till följd av att allvarliga olyckor har 
kunnat härledas till dominoeffekter. År 1996 införde Europeiska Unionen Seveso II direktivet 
som fastslog att dominoeffekter skulle tas i beaktning i riskanalyser inom processindustrin, 
dock adresserades inte nivån på analyserna i direktivet. Detta faktum i kombination med den 
höga nivå av komplexitet som förknippas med dominoeffekter har lett till att dessa effekter 
framförallt behandlas på ett kvalitativt sätt, vilket leder till resultat baserade på subjektiva 
bedömningar och förenklade antaganden. Det huvudsakliga syftet med den senaste 
forskningen har varit att ta fram verktyg och modeller för att kunna kvantifiera riskerna 
associerade med dominoeffekter. Gemensamt för dessa modeller är att de behandlar 
dominoeffekter i en separat analys, med utgångspunkt från resultaten av en konventionell 
QRA. Modellerna visar att dominoeffekter kan analyseras kvantitativt, men de ger ingen 
vägledning om hur dessa effekter bör integreras och behandlas i en QRA. Det finns därmed 
ett behov av heltäckande metodiker som tydliggör hur dominoeffekter skall integreras och 
analyseras inom ramarna för en konventionell QRA. Målet med denna rapport har varit att 
utveckla en heltäckande metod för att genomföra en QRA med avseende på dominoeffekter 
och skada på egendom, vilken baseras på den senaste forskningen inom området. Under 
utvecklandet av metoden har fokus legat på att göra integreringen av dominoeffekter till en 
naturlig del av analysen och på så vis göra metodiken praktiskt tillämpbar inom tidsramarna 
för en QRA. För att säkerställa metodens funktionalitet har kriterier för vad metoden skall 
kunna hantera definierats: 
 
 Metoden skall möjliggöra analys av kedjor av olyckshändelser med hjälp av 
väletablerade analystekniker och skall inte vara beroende av komplexa algoritmer. 
 
 Metoden skall möjliggöra framtagande av en heltäckande riskbild för skada på 
egendom med hänsyn till samtliga olycksscenarier, där potentiella dominoscenarier är 
inkluderade. 
 
 Metoden skall möjliggöra analys av risken för skada på egendom med hänsyn till 
dominoeffekter både inom en anläggningsdel och mellan olika anläggningsdelar. 
 
 Metoden skall möjliggöra framtagande och validering av platsspecifika 
säkerhetsavstånd med hänsyn till skada på egendom och dominoeffekter. 
 
Metoden har applicerats i en fallstudie, i vilken en del av ett oljeraffinaderi har analyserats, 
detta för att utvärdera hur väl den är applicerbar i praktiken. Under fallstudien har det visats 
att metoden är tillämpbar för kvantitativ analys av risken för skada på egendom med hänsyn 
till dominoeffekter och att ovannämnda kriterier har uppfyllts. Resultaten från fallstudien 
påvisar vikten av att inkludera dominoeffekter i kvantitativa riskanalyser, då risken annars 
kan underskattas. Utvärderingen av metoden ledde fram till slutsatsen att analysen bör 
avgränsas till att enbart behandla första ordningens eskalation. Avgränsningen minimerar 
osäkerheterna associerade med dominoeffekter och gör analysen mer tillförlitlig. Dessutom 
medför avgränsningen att metodens tillämpbarhet för analys av större system ökar, då 
komplexiteten och arbetsbelastningen minskar. En annan slutsats som har kunnat dras är att 
riskkonturer för skada på egendom möjliggör identifiering av kritiska områden, i vilka risken 
för dominoeffekter är betydande. Under arbetets gång har behovet av ett väletablerat 
acceptanskriterium för skada på egendom påvisats. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Several major accidents that have occurred in process plants are the results of unexpected 
domino effects (Darbra, 2010). When an accident occurs inside a process plant, its physical 
effects (including overpressure, heat radiation and impact of flying fragments) often damage 
the surrounding equipments, which can lead to a loss of containment and additional accident 
scenarios. The impact of a domino effect highly depends on the design and nature of the 
installations, as well as the presence of reliable safeguards. 
 
Domino effects can be described as the cumulative effect from a chain of unwanted events, 
with severe consequences. Domino effects are often seen as synonym to a cascade of 
accidents, in which the consequences of a previous accident are increased by the following 
ones.  Domino effects can be classified into two different categories: internal and external 
domino effects (Reniers, 2010). Internal domino effects are recognized as the escalation of an 
accident within the boundaries of an industry, whereas an external domino effect is 
recognized as the escalation outside the boundaries.  
 
In 1996 the European Union adopted the Seveso II Directive. The Directive specifies actions 
to be taken to prevent and limit the impact of serious chemical accidents. In the Directive it is 
clearly stated that domino effects shall be considered. The members of the Union shall ensure 
that the concerned authority is informed of process industries that have an increased risk due 
to domino effects both within the plant and between different plants. It is important that the 
industries take these effects into account when dealing with safety issues, so that a high level 
of safety can be achieved. The industries shall also make sure that the public is informed of 
the risks and that the fire and rescue service has all the information needed to handle an 
accident in the most effective way (European Commission, 1996).  
 
In Sweden the Seveso II Directive covers several different regulations, with the core in the 
regulations by Arbetsmiljöverket, AFS 2005:19. The regulations cover process industries that 
deal with specific hazardous substances in a greater amount than set values. In these 
regulations it is specified that the business operator is obligated to prevent serious chemical 
accidents and to limit the human and environmental impact if such an accident occurs. 
Process industries covered by the regulations shall establish a risk analysis, where domino 
effects are taken into account (AFS 2005:19). 
 
The Seveso II Directive and the Swedish regulations by Arbetsmiljöverket have in common 
that they state that domino effects shall be analysed, but how this shall be done and the level 
of detail is not specified. Due to that fact and the high degree of complexity linked with 
domino effects, these aspects are mostly dealt with in a qualitative manner. Such approach 
leads to subjective assessments and is highly dependent on simplified assumptions, leading to 
results that may be questionable. The objectives of recent projects have mainly been on 
developing and validating tools for the quantification of the risk associated with domino 
effects. Looking at existing approaches for analysing domino effects in a quantitative way, 
several models are available in literature. Common for these models are that they treat 
domino scenarios in separate analysis, starting from the results gained from a conventional 
QRA. These models show that domino effects effectively can be integrated in a QRA, but do 
not provide any guidance of how these effects should be incorporated in an analysis. Thus, 
there is a need for comprehensive methods that clearly defines how domino effects effectively 
can be implemented and analysed within the boundaries of a conventional QRA framework. 
Recent research, as the studies by Cozzani et al. (2006) and Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2010), 
have revealed that neglecting the risk of domino effect in QRAs leads to the risk being 
underestimated. Nowadays, no risk assessment can be considered complete without including 
analysis of domino effects (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). 
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1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of the study is to enable the risk of domino effects to be quantitatively analysed 
within the boundaries of a conventional QRA framework. The study should reveal the 
prerequisites and tools needed for the quantitative analysis of domino scenarios. The 
incorporation of domino scenarios in the QRA should not affect the way in which the analysis 
is carried out, nor affect the time needed for analysis in a substantially matter. By enabling the 
domino effect to be analysed quantitatively, the subjectivity of the analysis is lowered 
compared to a qualitative approach. By quantifying the risk of domino effects, vulnerable 
parts of the system can more easily be identified, and thus enables safety measures to be 
implemented where they contribute the most to the overall safety. The method enables 
acceptable safety distances between equipment within process plants to be analysed in more 
detailed way, which in turn contributes to the prevention of major accidents in process 
industries due to domino effects. 
 
1.2   Objective 
The objective of the study is to develop a comprehensive method for performing quantitative 
risk analysis with respect to property damage and domino effects in a process plant. The 
method shall guide and clearly define how domino scenarios can be incorporated in a QRA 
framework. 
 
1.3 Research questions  
Following questions are to be answered in the thesis, this to ensure that the objective is 
reached:  
 
 How can a method for performing quantitative risk analysis with respect to property 
damage and domino effects in a process plant be developed? 
o What tools are needed for analysing the risk of domino effects?   
o To what extent does the level of uncertainty increase when including domino 
effects in the analysis? 
o Can such a method be used to determine site specific safety distances in the 
design phase?   
 
 Is there a change in the overall risk when including domino effects in the quantitative 
risk analysis?  
 
1.4 Delimitations 
The study is delimited to only deal with the effects of mechanical and technical nature. The 
study does not deal with any economical or environmental effects due to domino effects.  No 
natural hazards, e.g. floods, earthquakes etc. have been dealt with in the study.  
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1.5 Method 
The study is divided into four parts: literature review, method development, case study and 
evaluation of the case study. The aim of the four parts is to fulfil the purpose and to reach the 
objective. How well the purpose and objective are met is then discussed and conclusions are 
drawn. Figure 1 presents a flowchart of the process and in the following sections the different 
parts of the flowchart are discussed.   
 
 
 
 
During the process, a halfway presentation of the thesis was given for persons with expertise 
knowledge in the risk management field. The aim of this presentation was to receive feedback 
and input for further improvements regarding the developed method, making the study more 
reliable.  
    
1.5.1 Literature review 
The report is based on a literature study, where relevant literature in the specific field is 
reviewed in order to get an up to date understanding of the existing research and to identify 
where new contribution is needed. Literature from different authors is studied and the material 
most applicable and relevant for this study is presented. The literature review begins with a 
presentation of the core elements associated with a quantitative risk analysis in process 
industries, presented in chapter 2. The characteristics of domino effects and how the chain of 
accidents may take form are presented in chapter 3. Existing models and tools enabling the 
quantitative analysis of domino scenarios are highlighted in chapter 3. Tools that are 
recommended in the method are then further elaborated on in chapter 4. 
 
  
 
Conclusions 
Literature 
review 
Method 
development 
Case study 
Evaluation of 
the method 
Purpose 
and 
objective 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart of the methodology used in this study. 
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1.5.2 Method development 
In this part of the study the method is developed and how it should be used is presented. The 
method can be seen as a framework, where the authors compile different existing approaches 
of domino effects analysis and make additions and modifications when needed. The focus of 
the method development is that the method should be manageable from a limited time 
perspective and that domino effects shall be taken into account in a QRA without having to 
make a separate analysis.  
 
1.5.3 Case study 
The objective of the case study is to test the method on an existing process plant, this in order 
to see how well it is applicable in practice. The focus of the case study is therefore not on the 
specific results, but if the method is manageable within a reasonable time span and whether 
the parts included in the method are sufficient and well suited for the purpose. Throughout the 
case study, the use of the methodology process is documented and further reviewed in the 
evaluation step. Although the focus of the case study does not lie on the specific results, it is 
still of some concern to evaluate the results gained to judge whether the results are realistic or 
not and whether domino effects have a significant impact on the overall risk. 
 
1.5.4 Evaluation of the method 
By evaluating how well the method is applicable in practice, gaps and weaknesses within the 
proposed method can be discovered and revised if needed. Prerequisites needed for the 
analysis and problematic aspects associated with the method are discussed and the need of 
further research in the area is presented. 
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2. QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS WITHIN PROCESS 
INDUSTRIES  
In this chapter, based on a literature review, the conventional approach of quantitative risk 
analysis in process industries is elaborated on to give the reader understanding of the baseline 
which the method is built upon.  
 
As stated in the introduction, an industry that handles hazardous material is by law forced to 
assess their risks to prevent that a major accident occurs. But what is risk? There are many 
definitions of risk and due to that fact, people from different academic areas often tend to 
misinterpret each other. The definition of risk used in this thesis is the combination of 
probability and consequence for an unwanted event to occur, that can bring harm to human 
beings, property or environment. By answering the following three questions, also known as 
the risk triplet by Kaplan and Garrick (1981), the risk profile can be determined: 
 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. How likely is it? 
3. What are the consequences?  
 
To answer these questions, one can perform a quantitative risk analysis (QRA), which is a 
systematic approach for analysing risk scenarios quantitatively. The QRA approach has 
mostly been adopted in the nuclear industry, but nowadays it is also commonly used within 
the process industry (Khan & Abbasi, 1998). A typical QRA contain four steps: 
 
 Hazard identification  
 Frequency analysis 
 Consequence analysis 
 Risk profile presentation   
 
Initially in every QRA, the scope and context of which the analysis is based on is defined. For 
each of the four steps there are many different tools available, which serves to give 
practitioners guidance when performing risk analysis. In literature, the term QRA is often 
associated with the quantitative risk assessment which can lead to confusion, if not clearly 
defining whether the terms should be seen as synonyms or not. In this thesis a distinction is 
made between the terms, in line with the Guidelines for engineering design for process safety 
by CCPS (2012). A flowchart, illustrating how the risk management process is seen in this 
study is presented in figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Flowchart of the risk management process (IEC, 1995). 
 
2.1 Scope and context 
All stakeholders involved in a project should reach an agreement of the area of interest and 
the level of detail in which the analysis is based on. A detailed description of the different 
parts within the system, giving information of what kind of hazardous material that is being 
used and in which amount, how it is processed and what kind of protection systems that are 
present are all important aspects that needs to be elaborated on in the context. Simplifying 
assumptions are always needed when analysing complex systems, such as a process industry, 
and it is important to clearly define the assumptions of which the analysis is built on so that 
these uncertain parameters can be evaluated in a later stage of the analysis. Another important 
aspect of defining the assumptions is to minimize the confusion that can arise when external 
evaluators interpret the results. All delimitations, factors that are completely discarded in the 
analysis should also be defined so that it is clear that the result reflects on the context of the 
analysis, which shall not be confused with the reality.   
 
2.2 Risk identification 
The risk identification step is probably the most crucial step in a QRA, due to the fact that it is 
where the foundation of the QRA is laid. If one of the most important hazards is overlooked, 
it is quite evident that the overall objective of the risk analysis cannot be satisfactorily 
achieved. The limited time associated with QRAs does not always allow every single risk 
source to be evaluated, therefore it is important to identify a number of representative risk 
scenarios that can cover a wide range of possible threats. This is often done through a 
preliminary risk assessment, were low severity and low frequency risk sources can be 
screened out. However, in complex systems it is time consuming just to perform a preliminary 
assessment and to do it with a high level of accuracy requires great expertise knowledge and 
tools that enable risks to be systematically mapped.  
  
Risk analysis 
 Scope and context 
 Risk identification 
 Frequency estimation 
 Consequence estimation 
 Risk profile 
Risk evaluation 
 Is the risk acceptable? 
 Risk reduction measures 
 Validation 
Risk reduction and control 
 Decision making 
 Implementation 
 Management 
Risk assessment 
Risk management 
process 
7 
 
According to the Seveso II Directive, risks that do not fall under the category "major 
accident" potential can be screened out in a preliminary assessment (Kirschsteiger, 1998). 
"Major accident" is defined in the third article of the Directive as: 
 
An occurrence such as a major emission, fire or explosion resulting from uncontrolled 
developments in the course of the operation of any establishment covered by this 
Directive, and leading to serious danger to human health and/or the environment, 
immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more 
dangerous substances (Commission of the European Communities, 1997, p.6).  
 
Given this threshold it should be a straightforward approach to list all potential risks, however 
is the definition deemed as a bit vague which can lead to different interpretations being made. 
For example, it is not obvious what is significant for a major emission, fire or explosion and 
in what range serious danger should be considered. Disregarding the obvious obstacles, there 
are some tools available that enable the risk identification to be approached systematically 
with a high level of certitude (Kirschsteiger, 1998). 
 
Several tools for risk identification are available; the most common techniques have been 
reviewed by the US Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) in their Guidelines for 
Hazard Evaluation Procedures (1992) and are as follow:  
 
 Checklists  
 Safety review Indices ( Dow F/EI & Mond) 
 Preliminary hazard analysis 
 "What if?" analysis 
 Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) and Hazard identification study (HAZID) 
 Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMEA) 
 
The selection of preferred technique should strongly be dependent on the complexity in the 
object analysed. For a process plant, which is not complex or innovating in the way they store 
and process hazardous material, a simple "expert review" may be sufficient (Kirschsteiger, 
1998). For complex plants where significant processing of hazardous material takes place, the 
general approach is to use a more deep analysis technique, such as the HAZOP. Often are 
different techniques used in combination to ensure a satisfactory level of hazard 
identification. The US Guidlines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis 
recommends a structured method, like HAZOP or FMEA, as a complement to more general 
methods, such as "expert review" (CCPS, 1989). For guidance of which technique that should 
be used and when, readers are referred to Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures by 
CCPS (1992) and Lees´ third ed. by Mannan (2005).  
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2.3 Frequency estimation  
The next step in the QRA is to estimate the frequency in which the identified representative 
risk scenarios occur. Methods such as event and fault tree analysis are conventionally used to 
estimate these frequencies. By combining the two approaches, a bowtie analysis can be 
performed, which is also an established method. These approaches to system analysis can be 
used to model the failure behavior of process industries (Kirschsteiger, 1998). Regardless of 
choice of method, input in form of substantiated data for failure rates is crucial for any 
attempts to estimate a reliable hazard frequency (Nilsson, 2003). But due to the fact that it is 
hard to find statistical failure rate data for all components in a system, the estimation of 
failure frequencies often needs to be combined with some assumptions. Process industries are 
linked with a high degree of complexity and interdependencies are therefore a fact, thus 
simplifying assumptions can be seen as a prerequisite to enable analysis of such systems. 
However, every assumption made contributes to heightening the level of uncertainty and in 
turn may the reliability of the results be questioned. To take these uncertainties into account it 
is preferable to perform a sensitivity analysis of critical factors, which can have great 
influences on the results. 
 
As stated above, frequency estimations are always linked to a level of uncertainty, which 
influence should be analysed. A well known method for taking uncertainties into account is 
the Monte Carlo simulation analysis. Monte Carlo simulations are often implemented in the 
framework for QRA and serve to analyse a variety of uncertainty permutations 
simultaneously (Rezaie et al., 2007). By asserting a proper distribution function (normal, log-
normal, etc) for each uncertain variable, a stochastic permutation of the uncertainties can be 
created. Through intensive simulation (1000 – 10 000 runs) it is possible to analyse how the 
frequency differs as a function of the uncertainties in the input variables. The number of runs 
should be dependent on the project size and the importance of risk (ibid.). The method 
enables frequency rates to be estimated in a confidence interval instead of a fixed value, 
which can be assumed as a more accurate representation of the reality (ibid.).   
  
2.4 Consequence analysis 
When conducting a consequence analysis for a process plant the first step is to analyse the 
release scenario. Important inputs for this initial analysis are the release rate, leak duration, 
amount of fuel and the ambient conditions (CCPS, 1999). The next step in the analysis is 
dependent on whether the released substance is flammable or toxic. For toxic releases it is 
mainly the dispersion of the substance and the toxic effect that needs to be analysed to 
determine the consequences (ibid.). If the substance is flammable the release may result in 
either explosion or fire. For the calculation of overpressure effects due to an explosion either 
point source models, e.g. TNT models, or multilevel models, e.g. the Multi-Energy model and 
the Baker-Strehlow model, may be used (Mannan, 2005). When analysing the effects of a fire 
the consequences are mostly dependent of the radiation effects. Which method that should be 
used to analyse the emitted radiation is dependent of the type of fire; pool fire, jet fire, flash 
fire or fireball. There are several computational tools available for the consequence analysis, 
for example ALOHA, PHAST, HAZDIG, RIB- "spridning i luft". It is important to point out 
that these methods represent a simplification of reality and that the input data is linked with 
uncertainties. Therefore, as described in section, 2.3, it is beneficial to perform a sensitivity 
analysis.      
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2.5 Risk profile presentation   
Quantitative risk measures are conventionally presented in either individual or societal risk. 
Both individual and societal risks are based on the same analysis parameters, the incident 
frequency and consequence; it is just different ways of presenting the risk. The individual risk 
is the risk that an individual is exposed to at a certain distance from the source of hazard and 
it is usually expressed as annual risk of death and presented as iso-risk contours (Renjith & 
Madhu, 2010), see figure 3 for a simplified example. 
 
 
 
 
The individual risk does not take into account if an accident may lead to an impact on several 
people, then the societal risk is better applied (AIChE, 2012). The individual risk is specified 
for a certain location, while the societal risk covers a whole area. Societal risk is the risk a 
group of people is exposed to and it is usually presented in an FN-curve, a fictive example is 
presented in figure 4. In the graph the expected annual frequency (F) of the number of 
casualties (N or more) are plotted (Wood, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. An example of a FN-curve. 
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Figure 3. An example of individual risk presented by iso-risk contours. 
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The results from a QRA can also be presented in a risk matrix, where the consequences can be 
either environmental, economical or human. The advantage of the matrix approach is that it is 
easy to rank the different accidents, which can be the base to decide where risk reduction 
actions shall be taken (Tugnoli et al., 2011). The matrix contain frequencies on the y-axis and 
consequences on the x-axis. Each axis is divided into categories depending on the expected 
frequency of accurance and the severity. The categorisation can either be specificied by 
specific ranges or dependent on the order of presedence, an example of a risk matrix is 
presented in figure 5. Accidents in the upper right corner, with high frequency and severity, 
are the ones with the highest risk. If the risk is acceptable or not shall be decided by the risk 
criteria for the specific company, with a maximum risk acceptance according to relevant 
legislation (ibid.). The matrix approach is also often used in a preliminary assessment and is a 
good tool that enable risk scenarios to be screened out in an effective way (ibid.). The 
categorisation is then rather unspecified and the result, to a high extent, rely on expert 
judgements. 
 
 
 
>Once a year 
 
     
Once every  
1-10 years 
     
Once every 10-
100 years 
     
Once every 
100-1000 years 
     
<Once every 
1000 years 
     
Human Temporary 
mild 
discomfort 
 
Some people 
injured, 
enduring 
discomfort 
Some serious 
injuries 
Some 
fatalities and 
several 
serious 
injuries 
Several 
fatalities and 
tens of 
injuries 
Environmental No sanitation, 
little 
dispersion 
Easy 
sanitation, 
little 
dispersion 
Easy 
sanitation, 
large 
dispersion 
Severe 
sanitation, 
little 
dispersion 
Severe 
sanitation, 
large 
dispersion 
Economical <0,01 EUR 
million 
 
 
0,01-0,1 EUR 
million 
0,1-1  
EUR million 
1-2  
EUR million 
 
 
>2  
EUR million 
Figure 5. An example of a risk matrix (Davidsson et al., 2003). 
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3. DOMINO EFFECTS IN THE QRA FRAMEWORK 
Gaining understanding of the chain of events that may follow an initial accident is crucial for 
the integration of domino effects in a QRA. Therefore, it is of interest to review previous 
accidents and the characteristics that define the chain of events. Further, existing models that 
allow a quantitative assessment of domino effects are elaborated on, this to identify strength 
and further developing areas. Before moving on to the above sections, the term domino 
accident needs to be defined as it represents the foundation of which this study is based on.  
 
3.1 Definition of domino accident 
After a primary accident has occurred, there is a risk of surrounding equipments being 
damaged due to exposure of physical effects of the primary event, which in turn can cause 
secondary or tertiary events. This phenomenon is known as a domino effect and the physical 
effects responsible for setting it in motion, also known as escalation vectors, are: radiation, 
overpressure and fragment projection. Although there is no consensus regarding a universal 
definition of a domino effect, some elements that are required for a domino accident to take 
place have been identified. The elements needed for a domino accident to occur are presented 
in table 1, with the definitions proposed by Reniers and Cozzani (2013). For the simplicity, 
only primary and secondary scenarios are mentioned in table 1 but all of the features also 
apply to any tertiary or higher order of propagation.  
  
Table  1. Elements needed for a domino accident (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). 
Element Definition 
 
Primary 
scenario 
An accident scenario that starts a domino effect propagating and 
escalating to other process or storage units, triggering one or several 
secondary accident scenarios (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013, p.32). 
 
Secondary 
scenario 
 
An accident scenario caused by the impact of an escalation vector 
generated by a primary accident scenario (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013, p.32). 
 
Propagation 
 
In case of a spatial domino effect, the propagation indicates the involvement of other units or 
equipment items, present at different positions with respect to that of the primary accident. In 
case of a temporally domino effect, there is propagation within the same 
unit or equipment item (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013, p.32). 
 
Escalation 
 
The intensification of the overall consequences of an undesired event (Reniers & Cozzani, 
2013, p.32). 
 
Escalation 
vector 
 
A vector of physical effects (radiation, overpressure or fragment projection) generated by the 
primary accident scenario (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013, p.32). 
 
As stated earlier, domino effects are linked with a high degree of complexity and it is 
therefore difficult to unambiguously define a domino accident. Reniers and Cozzani (2013) 
state that defining what should be considered as a domino accident is not just an academic 
exercise, since several technical standards and the legislation require specifically that domino 
effects shall be analysed. Based on the elements needed for a domino accident to occur and by 
analysing fifteen different definitions, Reniers and Cozzani (2013) have compiled the 
following definition of a domino accident: 
 
An accident in which a primary unwanted event propagates within an equipment 
(“temporally”), or/and to nearby equipment (“spatially”), sequentially or simultaneously, 
triggering one or more secondary unwanted events, in turn possibly triggering further (higher 
order) unwanted events, resulting in overall consequences more severe than those of the 
primary event (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013, p.35). 
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As the definition states; given that a primary accident occurs, the overall consequences need 
to be increased for a chain of events to be accounted for as a domino effect. In practice this 
means that secondary or higher events with lower escalation potential than of the primary 
event should be excluded from the analysis as these events do not increase the overall risk.  
 
3.2 Review of statistical data 
Due to the fact that full-scale experiments are very expensive and more or less impossible to 
conduct, researchers must make use of data from real life accidents (Reniers & Cozzani, 
2013). Historical analysis of domino accidents can be useful to identify specific features for 
the domino effect: initiating events, materials most frequently involved, the causes and 
consequences and the most common chain of accidents (Darbra et al., 2010). This information 
can be used by practitioners as input in their risk assessments and thus making the results 
more reliable.  
 
As seen in appendix A, most domino events have originated from fixed installations, where 
storage and process units are the most common ones. Looking at the substances most 
frequently involved in domino events, combustible substances represent a total of 89 percent. 
LPG, oil and gasoline represent the majority of substances associated with domino accidents. 
Fires and explosions are the hazards responsible for initiating the chain of accidents; based on 
the result from Darbra et al. (2010) and Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2011), the two categories 
can approximately be seen as equal in numbers of initiating events. Comparing the different 
types of fires and explosions, one can see that vapour cloud explosions (VCE) and pool fires 
are the most frequent causes of initiating a domino sequence. Furthermore, Darbra et al. 
(2010) have performed an event tree analysis, by evaluating 225 domino accidents the 
characteristics of a chain of accident could be identified. The different chain of accidents and 
their relative frequency are presented in figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6. Event tree analysis of the chain of accidents and their relative frequency (Darbra et al., 2010). 
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The chain of accidents can be approximated with the knowledge of the expected escalation 
vector following the primary scenario. In a study by Cozzani et al. (2006), which was a 
revision of a previous study by the same authors conducted in 2004, more than 100 domino 
accidents gathered from the MHIDAS database were analysed. The study reveals how the 
expected secondary scenarios can be linked to escalation vectors following the primary 
scenario. Table 2 summarises the expected secondary scenarios that should be included in 
analysis for different primary scenarios and their escalation vector.   
 
Table  2. Escalation vectors and expected secondary scenarios for different primary scenarios (Cozzani et al., 
2006). 
Primary scenario Escalation vector Expected secondary scenarios
a 
 
Pool fire  
 
Radiation, fire impingement  
 
Jet fire, pool fire, BLEVE, toxic release 
Jet fire Radiation, fire impingement  Jet fire, pool fire, BLEVE, toxic release 
Fireball Radiation, fire impingement  Tank fire 
Flash fire Fire impingement  Tank fire 
Mechanical explosion
b Fragments, overpressure  Allc 
Confined explosion
b
  Overpressure Allc
 
BLEVE
b 
Fragments, overpressure Allc 
VCE Overpressure, fire impingement  Allc
 
Toxic release - - 
a 
Expected secondary scenarios also depend on the properties of target vessel inventory. 
b 
Additional accident scenarios may take place simultaneously (e.g. pool fires, fireballs and toxic releases). 
c 
All, any of the scenarios listed in column 1 may be triggered by the escalation vector. 
 
3.3 The chain of accidents and different types of domino effects 
When talking about domino effects, the distinction between internal and external domino 
effect is often made. If the escalation of an accident occurs inside the boundaries of a process 
industry it is classified as an internal domino effect and if the escalation of an accident occurs 
outside the boundaries of a process industry it is classified as an external domino effect 
(Reniers, 2010). As the statistical review shows, the chain of accidents can assume different 
forms, from a chain of single-level to a chain of multi-level accidents (Reniers & Cozzani, 
2013). Principle structures for chain of accidents are presented in figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Principle structures for chain of accidents. 
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Looking at figure 7, it is obvious that a domino accident is linked with a high degree of 
complexity and that the chain of accidents can take many different forms. For example, as the 
dark blue arrows points out in figure 7, propagation to a secondary unit can both be 
influenced by the escalation vector from the primary event, as well as from another secondary 
event. To deal with the complexity issue Khan and Abbasi (1998) defined two main features 
for escalation that are linked to the characteristics of a domino accident: 
 
 Direct escalation 
 Indirect escalation  
 
Direct escalation is caused by the immediate exposure of radiation, overpressure or fragment 
projection following an initiating event. Indirect escalation may occur if for example the 
control room is damaged by the primary scenario, leading to malfunctioning of a system or 
operators misreading system information, which in turn may lead to a secondary accident 
(Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). In order to achieve a more detailed identification of possible 
domino scenarios, two more categories of escalation have been defined (Reniers, 2010): 
 
 Escalation of low-severity initiating events 
 Interaction of different critical events 
 
Escalation of low-severity initiating events is crucial to take into consideration when 
performing an assessment of possible domino scenarios. History has shown that these low-
severity initiating events can have devastating consequences if they are not taken into 
consideration. Reniers and Cozzani (2013) describe an accident in an Italian plant for ethylene 
and propylene production. The chain of accidents was initiated by a minor rupture in a small-
diameter (2 inch) ethylene pipe, which lead to a small jet fire. Further, a 600 mm pipe was 
exposed to heat radiation and suffered a full-bore rupture causing a large jet fire. In turn this 
large jet fire impinged a pressurised propane storage tank leading to a BLEVE. Further the 
BLEVE damaged and caused three other pressurised tanks to complete rupture, which 
resulted in the plant being almost completely destroyed. In an ordinary risk assessment, only 
focusing on the consequences of the primary event, it is likely that low-severity initiating 
events will not be taken into consideration. Because of the low propagation potential 
following these low-severity scenarios it is easy to delimit the escalation effect to an area 
close to the initiating events. The second type of escalation is based on the starting point that 
the consequence of the initiating event is high. Further, the propagation in space is the main 
factor to take into consideration when assessing these kinds of scenarios (Reniers & Cozzani, 
2013). For this type of escalation, it is credible to assume that the propagation of the initiating 
event both can affect nearby units inside the boundaries of the plant as well as the surrounding 
buildings outside the plant boundaries.  
 
3.4 Existing models for the integration of domino effects in QRA 
Ever since the European Union adopted the Seveso II Directive in 1996, which requires the 
identification and assessment of domino hazards in the chemical industry, the phenomenon 
has been an important aspect for consideration in the field of major loss prevention. Since the 
early 1990s, efforts have been made to develop qualitative methods for the assessment of 
domino accidents (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). However, more recently has relevant research 
been conducted in order to develop tools and models that enable domino scenarios to be 
analysed quantitatively (Antonioni et al., 2009; Cozzani et al., 2005, 2006; Landucci et al., 
2009).  
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This research shows that three main categories of tools are needed for the quantitative 
analysis of domino events:  
 
 Threshold values for the identification of potential targets of escalation 
 Equipment damage models  
 Specific tools and procedures for the assessment of frequency and consequences of the 
overall domino scenarios 
 
Despite this up-to-date research, the most common approach for the inclusion of domino 
events in the risk assessment is still from a qualitative standpoint. Such approach leads to 
subjective assessments and is highly dependent on simplified assumptions, leading to results 
that may be questionable. Although QRA techniques have been widely used for the 
assessment of risk, its application to domino effects has been limited. The quantitative 
analysis of domino effects requires great computational resources, which have not been 
available until recent years (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). These authors also state that a greater 
attention for developing methods that enable domino effects to be integrated in the QRA 
framework is needed. 
 
Looking at existing approaches for analysing domino effects in a quantitative way, several 
models are available in literature. All of these models share common aspects, such as the tools 
used for the estimation of damage probability on target equipments and threshold values for 
the estimation of secondary accident scenarios. The typical differences between these models 
are found in the way that the chain of events is represented. Complex algorithms have been 
developed for this purpose, which have been programmed into computer codes in various 
software packages. Software packages that come with a user license cost. Common for these 
models are that they treat domino scenarios in separate analysis, starting from the results 
gained from a conventional QRA. These models show that domino effects effectively can be 
integrated in a QRA, but do not provide any guidance of how these effects should be 
incorporated in analysis. Thus, there is a need for comprehensive methods that clearly defines 
how domino effects effectively can be implemented and analysed within the boundaries of a 
conventional QRA framework. It is believed that such method can be developed starting from 
the baseline of a conventional QRA framework. By making use of the existing tools and 
models that have proven to deal with domino effects in a successfully way, the additional 
steps needed for the inclusion of domino effects can be implemented. To overcome the 
complexity concerning the inclusion of domino effects, as seen in existing models, the 
method should be applicable using well established tools and models that are likely to be 
accepted amongst practitioners.  
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4. METHOD DEVELOPMENT 
By expanding the QRA framework and implementing additional steps for the analysis of 
domino scenarios, the overall contribution of domino effects can be assessed. As previously 
stated, the existing models for dealing with domino effects in a quantitative way treats 
domino scenarios in a separate analysis, starting from the results gained from a conventional 
QRA. If integrating the risk of domino effects in a QRA framework, such aspects are deemed 
to be more efficiently analysed, thus shortening the time needed for analysis. The integration 
of domino effects also leads to a better estimation of high severity scenarios, thus enabling a 
more realistic risk profile to be computed. As Reniers and Cozzani (2013) describe; threshold 
values, equipment damage models and specific tools and procedures for the assessment of 
frequency and consequences of the overall domino scenarios, should be seen as prerequisites 
for the quantitative analysis of domino scenarios. As a starting point, the four classical steps 
of QRA: risk identification, frequency analysis, consequence analysis and risk profile 
presentation, described in chapter 2, represent the baseline of which the additional steps for 
integrating the analysis of domino scenarios are built on. For the method to be effective, the 
additional steps required to analyse the domino effect must be integrated in a logical way so 
that a natural flow in the process can be achieved. To ensure the functionality of the method, 
criteria´s for what the method should be able to deal with are defined: 
 
 The method should be applicable to well established analysis techniques and not 
dependent on complex algorithms for the analysis of the chain of events.   
 
 The method should enable a risk profile for property damage to be computed with 
regard to all accident scenarios, including potential domino scenarios.  
 
 The method should enable the risk of property damage with respect to domino effects 
to be analysed, both within a subsystem and between different subsystems.  
 
 The method should enable site specific safety distances either to be established or 
validated with regard to property damage and domino effects.   
 
4.1 The proposed method  
By combining relevant information obtained in the literature study, a new method that allows 
domino scenarios to be integrated and analysed within the boundaries of a conventional QRA 
framework has been developed. The method is presented in a detailed flowchart describing 
each required step in the method, as shown in figure 8. The non highlighted boxes represent 
the core of a conventional QRA framework, whereas the blue highlighted boxes represent the 
additional steps added for the analysis of domino scenarios. 
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Figure 8. Flowchart describing the methodology process. 
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Depending on the scope and context of the analysis, the method aims to enable the analysis of   
domino effects to be accounted for in multiple ways. This means, the method should enable 
the risk of domino effects within a subsystem, between different subsystems and from one 
plant to another to be accounted for in a QRA. As domino effects are complex phenomena, it 
is crucial that the scope and context is clearly defined, stating the level of detail and 
delimitations that the analysis is based upon. The method is seen as flexible, as it can be used 
to achieve many different objectives and can be adapted to various methods and tools for 
frequency and consequence analysis. The most intuitive approach is to perform event tree 
analysis for each representative scenario, enabling the chain of events and the final outcomes 
to be identified. Thus, the impact of all events that can trigger escalation to nearby units can 
be accounted for, leading to a more realistic assessment of the accident scenarios. The event 
tree analysis can be conducted with the aid of specific tools, input from statistical data, 
procedures for the calculation of damage probability and the estimation of damage states and 
loss of containment, which are further described in this chapter. To keep the analysis of 
domino effects to manageable proportions, a cut off criteria delimiting scenarios to be 
included in the analysis is proposed. In literature, a cut off criterion of frequencies above 
         is often used, this can be seen as reference value but can be changed to better suit 
the aim of the analysis. The event tree analysis method is well known amongst risk and safety 
experts and thus likely to be accepted in this context, why it is recommended to be the choice 
of frequency analysis technique. To enable the risk profile to easily be compared to an 
acceptable risk criterion, risk contours with regard to property damage is seen as the most 
appropriate way to present the risk profile. Further, a more detailed description of the 
different steps, box 1-9, needed to incorporate the risk of domino effects in a QRA is 
presented. 
 
Box 1: Define escalation threshold 
After defining the scope and context of the analysis, the escalation threshold values for the 
specific process plant shall be estimated. An escalation threshold value defines the highest 
amount of inflicting load that target equipment may be exposed to before taking damage. 
Escalation threshold values for different equipment categories and damage states are available 
in literature and are further described in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. A participatory approach, 
involving different actors of interest, is recommended when performing the hazard 
identification. Through workshop activities, hazards that pose the greatest threat of inflicting 
property damage can be identified. During the hazard identification, the threshold values can 
be used as support for the identification of critical areas with regard to domino effects, as 
these values can be converted into distances of impact. The advantage of taking domino 
sequences into consideration in the hazard identification step, rather than treating such effects 
in a separate step, is mainly that clusters of hazards with the potential to propagate into major 
consequences can be identified, which otherwise may have been overlooked. The 
representative scenarios should be chosen in a way that the risk of all potential accident 
scenarios is accounted for in the analysis.   
 
Box 2: Is propagation possible? & Box 3: Identification of all target equipments, leading to 
escalation 
From the base of the selected representative scenarios the first step in the analysis should be 
to calculate the frequency and consequence. By comparing the effect zone gained from the 
consequence analysis of the primary accident scenario with escalation threshold values for 
target equipments found within the zone, all targets that may suffer damage due to exposure 
of external loads may be identified. Box 2 and 3 represent this straightforward approach of 
identifying possible target equipments, and if propagation is deemed as possible the next step 
would be to analyse whether the target units can contribute to enhance the consequences of 
the primary accident, meaning is escalation possible?  
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Box 4: Relative domino risk ranking for targets 
As the definition of a domino accident, see section 3.1, states; given that a primary accident 
occurs, the overall consequences need to be increased for a chain of events to be accounted 
for as a domino effect. In practice this means that secondary or higher events with lower 
escalation potential than of the primary event should be excluded from the analysis as these 
events do not increase the overall risk. Based on the fact that many units containing hazardous 
substances often are situated close to each other, it is easy to end up in a circular reference if 
not addressing domino effects with a systematic approach. For this purpose a relative domino 
risk ranking is recommended, meaning that all target equipments found within the effect zone 
should be ranked with regard to their potential to escalate the consequences. This is a 
terminology not to be found in any existing literature, why it is important to clearly define its 
purpose and how it should be implemented in frequency assessments, this is further 
elaborated on in section 4.3.1. 
 
When ranking the escalation potential of scenarios, the recommended starting point is to 
investigate which units that have the largest amount of flammable substance, the flammability 
level and ignition point, and in what form it is being processed (gas or liquid, pressurised or 
atmospheric conditions). To avoid ending up in a circular reference, all potential chain of 
events that may follow a primary accident should be analysed starting from the unit having 
the greatest escalation potential and then working down the ladder to units with lower domino 
risk ranking. From a probabilistic point of view this means that escalation to the unit ranked 
next in line only is allowed in cases where the unit having the greatest escalation potential 
does not suffer damage. The same approach is applied when working down the relative 
domino risk ranking ladder. The risk of two or more units bursting simultaneously is 
preferably incorporated in the domino risk ranking as a separate scenario and treated in the 
same way as described above. However, the overall consequence of multiple units suffering 
damage simultaneously needs to be greater than the consequence of the involved unit with the 
largest escalation potential. Otherwise it should not be accounted for in analysis as damage to 
the unit having the greatest escalation potential can be seen to represent such scenario.  
     
Box 5: Damage probability analysis for each target 
After having determined the order in which the chain of events should be analysed, the next 
step is to estimate the probability of target equipments taking damage when exposed to 
external loads. This is preferably done with the aid of vulnerability models for different 
equipment categories. These models are based on multiple stress tests for different equipment 
categories exposed to various heat and overpressure loads, and are presented more in detail in 
section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. The recommended vulnerability models have been correlated as probit 
functions and enable the probability of damage to be calculated in a time efficient way, in 
contrary to more detailed simulation methods. The vulnerability models proposed for the 
estimation of damage probability to target equipment have been developed without any regard 
to safety systems. Therefore, the impact of safety systems is recommended to be assessed 
separately, thus allowing the damage probability to be updated with regard to safeguards and 
protection barriers. There are several types of safeguards and protection barriers, which have 
different mitigation effectiveness depending of the hazard and the type of system. 
Furthermore, the limited time associated with QRAs does not allow detailed analysis for risk 
reduction measures to be performed. Due to that fact, the use of generic values for risk 
reduction factors in combination with expert judgements is recommended and deemed to be 
adequate in the QRA framework.   
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Box 6: Estimate the damage state and the loss intensity & Box 7: Identification of escalation 
vectors 
In order to analyse which secondary accident scenarios that may follow target equipments 
suffering damage and in turn identify the following escalation vectors, the damage state and 
the loss intensity needs to be estimated. These classes describes the type of damage a unit 
may suffer due to exposure of external loads and the size of the subsequent loss of 
containment, these classes are presented in detail in section 4.2.1. The damage state and the 
loss intensity are estimated by comparing the received load to predefined escalation threshold 
values for different equipment categories. These classifications serve as input when secondary 
accidents and escalation vectors are estimated. With use of this input the release rate of the 
secondary loss of containment can be approximated. Having this information and knowing the 
properties of the substance and the conditions in which it is being processed, enables the 
secondary accident scenario to be estimated.   
 
Box 8: Consequence analysis for each escalation vector & Box 9: Further level of escalation 
possible? 
By performing a consequence analysis of the escalation vectors previously identified, 
additional effect zone can be computed for each secondary accident scenario. If additional 
units are found within these effect zones further level of escalation needs to be analysed, this 
is done by repeating the process described in boxes 3-9.  
 
As figure 7 in section 3.3 shows, a target unit can be exposed to physical effects from 
different risk sources simultaneously. As stated before, domino effects are linked with a high 
degree of complexity and if one were to incorporate these kinds of synergetic effects to the 
analysis, it is likely that the complexity would escalate to an unmanageable proportion. Up to 
this day, there are no computational software programs that can manage such aspects to be 
taken into account. Reniers and Cozzani (2013) clearly state that there is a need for 
simplifying assumptions in order to carry out the consequence analysis in a manageable time 
span and with regard to the limited computational capacity present, thus it is acceptable to 
analyse the consequences of accidents separately, neglecting the assessment of possible 
synergetic effects.  
 
The inclusion of domino effects, see the blue highlighted boxes in figure 8, requires 
understanding of the procedure in which the frequency and consequence of domino effects 
can be estimated. As stated earlier, the most intuitive and recommended approach to analyse 
the chain of events is to perform event tree analysis for each representative scenario. 
However, other approaches may be adopted as the method is not dependent of a certain 
analysis technique. Depending on the complexity and the objective of the analysis, other 
analysis techniques can be adopted to better suit the purpose of the analysis: fault tree 
analysis, bow-tie analysis, Bayesian network analysis and Monte Carlo simulations, are all 
examples of this and are further elaborated on in section 4.4.  
 
The analysis of domino scenarios in this framework is strongly dependent on vulnerability 
models for damage on different equipment categories, why these are further elaborated on in 
this chapter. The physical effects that initiate escalation must also be elaborated on, this to 
give the reader understanding of which parameters that affect the consequences of domino 
accidents. The following sections aim to give the reader input and the knowledge needed to 
perform the additional steps, boxes 1-9, that enable domino scenarios to be incorporated in a 
QRA. 
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4.2 Physical effects of escalation vectors 
Understanding of the physical effects of escalation vectors is particularly important when 
defining the relative domino risk ranking (box 4) and for the identification and consequence 
analysis of escalation vectors (box 7 and 8). As stated earlier, the physical effects due to 
exposure of escalation vectors (radiation, overpressure and fragment projection) are the 
initiating cause for setting a chain of accidents in motion. To give the reader understanding of 
which hazards that should be taken into account in the proposed method, how these hazards 
can be assessed and which parameters that have the greatest influence on the consequences, 
these physical effects are further described in the following sections.  
 
4.2.1 Fire 
As the statistical analysis described in appendix A shows, approximately 50 % of all domino 
accidents are caused by fires. The secondary targets are most frequently containments in 
terms of tanks, vessels and pipelines. The high temperature of the fires, typically between 800 
and 1200 degrees Celsius, lower the resistance of the shelter and leads to an increase of the 
internal pressure of the containment (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). Combustion of flammable 
gas-air mixture occurs if the concentration is within the flammability limits and conditions for 
ignition exist. A combustible gas-air mixture can be ignited by a local source, either a spark or 
a flame, or by the heating of the mixture to its ignition temperature. The local source needed 
to start a fire and the ignition temperature varies for different substances, as well as the 
flammability limit, which in turn is dependent of the pressure. Pressures below atmospheric 
pressure imply a narrow range of the flammability limit and overpressure implies a wide 
range (Mannan, 2005). The limits are also affected by the temperature, where a higher 
temperature equals a wider flammability range (ibid.).  
 
The characteristics of a fire are influenced by leakage rates, the burning substance, storage 
conditions and wind conditions (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). The heat developed by the fire 
can be transferred by: radiation, convection and conduction. Most of the heat from fires is 
transferred by radiation and convection, where convection represents about 75 % of the total 
transfer (Mannan, 2005). Even though radiation is corresponding to a lower percentage of the 
total heat transfer compared to convection, it is often the most significant heat transfer 
mechanism on an open plant (ibid.). This is mainly due to the fact that radiated heat is 
transferred directly to the objects nearby and crosses through open spaces, whereas 
convection mainly is transferred upwards. When analysing the consequences of a fire within a 
process plant it is therefore mainly the effects of radiation that should be analysed (Mannan, 
2005).  
 
4.2.1.1 Escalation caused by heat loads 
The types of fires relevant for escalation are: jet fires, pool fires, flash fires and fire balls 
(Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). Jet fires may occur if pressurised vessels of flammable gas or 
flashing liquid bursts and ignition occur. The high kinetic energy of a jet fire implies a large 
flame length in the direction of the release. The duration and the characteristics of the flame 
are affected by the phase of the burning substance, either vapour, liquid or two-phase. 
Depending on the phase and the amount of fuel, a jet fire's duration can vary from seconds to 
hours (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). A jet fire with long duration, several minutes to hours, can 
be modelled as a steady source of radiation (ibid.). The high heat load and temperature 
associated to jet fires implies a large amount of radiation, therefore jet fires are considered to 
have great escalation potential (ibid.). This fact, in combination with relatively high 
frequencies of occurrence, entails that jet fires are one of the most frequent causes of domino 
effects. 
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Jet fires may cause escalation either by direct flame impingement or distant radiation (Reniers 
& Cozzani, 2013). The effects of direct flame impingement of jet fires are well documented 
through past accidents and experiments. The escalation possibility from steady radiation is 
more specific for each scenario and has to be evaluated with models that not only take the 
intensity of radiation into account but also the features of the target equipment (ibid.).  
 
Pool fires usually occur when a pool of flammable liquid is generated and ignited, often due 
to a loss of containment of a vessel. The combustion takes place in the vapours generated 
from the pool and the duration of the fire is usually longer than in the case of a jet fire. The 
generally long duration of pool fires implies that it can be modelled as a steady source of 
radiation in most of the cases. A pool fire may lead to escalation either by distant radiation or 
fire engulfment (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). The modelling of pool fires are described in Lees' 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (Lees, 1996). 
 
Flash fires, also called vapour cloud fires, is the term for a low-turbulent combustion of a 
vapour cloud. The difference from a vapour cloud explosion is that a flash fire is associated 
with slow reactions leading to a low flame speed (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). The low 
reactivity may occur due to an inhomogeneous mixture of fuel and air, a concentration close 
to the flammability limits or a stratified cloud (ibid.). The duration of a flash fire is short, 
usually not longer than a few seconds, and therefore it is not likely to lead to secondary 
damage due to radiation. The possibility of escalation is instead dependent of the ignition of 
flammable material due to flame impingement (ibid.).  
 
Fireballs are a phenomena caused by immediate ignition of a vapour cloud generated by a 
severe loss of containment (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). The duration of a fireball is longer 
than of a flash fire, up to one minute, and associated with a high intensity of radiation (ibid.).  
Although the duration of a fireball is longer than in the case of a flash fire, it is still relatively 
short compared to the time to failure for the target equipment. This fact entails that the effect 
of fireballs often is neglected in domino effects analysis. Fireballs may however cause 
damage on atmospheric vessels due to the high intensity of radiation and shall in a detailed 
domino effects analysis therefore be included as a possible cause of escalation (Reniers & 
Cozzani, 2013). 
 
Domino effects triggered by fire are typically delayed relative to the initial event, in contrary 
to escalation triggered by overpressure effects and missile projection where the escalation 
occurs rapidly (ibid.). The delay of escalation can be minutes up to hours and is calculated in 
the means of time to failure (ttf). The ttf can be used to estimate if mitigation efforts can be 
taken before escalation occurs. The ttf depends on the characteristics of the target equipment 
and the heat load transmitted to it. The key issue to protect a target from a fire hazard is 
therefore to prevent or mitigate the exposure of the target equipment, for instance by thermal 
coating.  
 
The vessel wall temperature determines the strength of the wall and thus the pressure carrying 
ability. The increase in vessel wall temperature due to external heat load is highly dependent 
of the phase of the stored substance, where heating of a vessel containing gas entails a rapid 
increase of the vessel wall temperature due to the low cooling effect of the gas while the wall 
temperature of a vessel containing a liquid substance remains near the temperature of the 
liquid due to the high cooling effect (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). If the vessel contains a liquid 
substance, the external heat load instead mainly causes a rapid increase of the internal 
pressure, causing an increased stress to the vessel shell. The vessel will burst when the hoop 
stress is greater than the strength of the vessel wall material (ibid.). Even if pressure relief 
valves are present and controlling the pressure at a level that is lower than the nominal burst 
pressure of the vessel, failure may occur due to decreasing burst pressure resulting from an 
increase of the vessel wall temperature (ibid.). 
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In the proposed method, flash fire is not considered as a credible accident scenario leading to 
escalation, this due to the short duration associated to the phenomenon. As stated, escalation 
due to equipments being exposed to fire can either be triggered by distant source radiation or 
flame engulfment/impingement. If target equipment is engulfed or impinged by fire, the heat 
load received by the target equipment should be estimated by considering both radiation 
effects and convective heat transfer effects. 
4.2.2 Explosions 
An explosion is defined as a rapid and violent release of energy (Mannan, 2005). The 
magnitude of the explosion is dependent of the velocity in which the energy is released. There 
are three main types of energy that can be released through an explosion: physical, chemical 
and nuclear energy. In the process industry it is mainly chemical explosions, in particular 
through combustion of flammable gas that is the main threat and thus should be prioritised in 
the QRA (ibid.). Explosions caused by combustion of flammable gas can either propagate 
through detonation or deflagration, where detonation is most severe and travels at speeds in 
the order of thousands of metres per second. In the process industries there are different types 
of explosions that can occur (Mannan, 2005): 
 
 Physical explosion 
 Condensed phase explosion 
 Vapour cloud explosions (VCE) 
 Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) 
 Confined explosions with reaction 
 Dust explosions 
 
4.2.2.1 Escalation caused by overpressure loads  
Damage on target equipment due to explosions can be correlated to the overpressure loads 
developed by the blast wave. Depending on the amount of energy and the velocity in which it 
is released, the overpressure load generated by an explosion may vary. Depending on the type 
of explosion there are different methods for the calculation of such overpressure effects. 
When considering point source explosions, for example BLEVE and condensed phase 
explosion, a TNT model is often used, which is conservative model that converts the energy 
released into TNT equivalents enabling a simplified approach for the consequence assessment 
of overpressure effects (Mannan, 2005). When analysing more complex phenomena, for 
example VCE, the models used shall be able to handle peak pressure and impulses in the near 
and far field. The Multi-Energy Model and the Baker-Strehlow method are used worldwide 
for these kinds of calculations. In recent years the application of Computational Fluid 
Dynamics (CFD) models for explosion analysis of complex systems has increased (Reniers & 
Cozzani, 2013). However, such modelling is very time consuming and thus not preferable 
when analysing domino effects in a QRA, as the time associated with such analysis most 
certainly would be exceeded. All type of explosions should be considered when analysing 
property damage with regard to domino effects. No explicit model is recommended for the 
proposed method, as the choice of model should be dependent on the software program at 
hand and the scope and context defining the level of detail in which the analysis is based on.   
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4.2.2.2 Escalation caused by missile projection 
A possible secondary effect of explosions is projection of fragments, also referred to as 
missile projection. Missile projection is one of the most frequent causes of domino effects in 
process industries. A burst of a vessel is a typically accident that may result in missile 
projection (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). The fragments can travel up to 1 kilometre, which 
implies that the possibility of secondary or tertiary levels of escalation must be considered for 
a long range, relative to the initial position (ibid.). Gubinelli and Cozzani (2009) have 
conducted a survey of more than 180 accidents that lead to missile projection to analyse the 
cause. The result was as follows: 
 
 Fired BLEVE (62 %) 
 Unfired BLEVE (12 %) 
 Physical explosion (10 %) 
 Confined explosion (10 %) 
 Runaway reaction (6 %) 
 
All causes to missile projection have in common that they are initialised by internal energy, 
most frequently in the form of high pressure, in the vessel (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). The 
increase of internal energy can propagate cracks in the containment, resulting in 
fragmentation and transformation of the internal energy of the vessel into kinetic energy of 
the fragments (ibid.). Fragments can also be projected by rotating equipments, such as 
turbines and compressors. Missile projections caused by fragmentation due to a burst of a 
vessel or by projection from rotating objects are described as "primary missiles", due to the 
fact that they are directly generated from the failure of equipment (ibid.). "Secondary 
missiles" instead describes the case when a blast wave picks up objects in the surroundings of 
the accidental unit. When conducting an assessment of domino effects the focus is usually on 
primary missiles, since they are more likely to cause escalation (ibid.). 
 
Assessment of missile projections can be divided into three steps: calculation of fragment 
velocity, estimation of fragmentation patterns and impact analysis. Different methods are 
available for the calculation of these three steps. The proposed method is not dependent on 
any explicit method, however it is important to have fundamental knowledge of the three 
steps needed for the assessment of missile projection, why these steps are further elaborated 
on. 
 
The fragment velocity is generally significantly higher than normal wind velocities, thus 
making it reasonable to neglect the effect of wind direction and velocity when analysing this 
phenomenon (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). The velocity of the fragments is dependent of the 
kinetic energy, which in turn is dependent of the scenario and the design of the vessel. There 
are several different methods for calculating the kinetic energy of the fragments, different 
models are presented and reviewed in Lees' Loss Prevention in the Process Industries by 
Mannan (2005). Some methods consider the efficiency of energy transformation from internal 
into kinetic, which is primarily affected by two parameters: the condition of the vessel when it 
bursts and the condition of the content in the vessel (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). Other 
methods are based on the simplification that almost all of the energy is transferred or using a 
transfer ratio based on statistical data. There are also more complex methods based on the 
energy and momentum balance, where the Baker model, described by Baker et al. (1983), is 
the most frequently used. The models are often restricted to particular types of vessels, 
fragment geometries or chemicals, so it is important to choose a method that is representative 
for the situation that is analysed (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013).  
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The transformation ratio of energy differs in a large range depending on the model used. It 
has been validated against experimental data that the use of a kinetic energy model is suitable 
in case of BLEVEs and mechanical explosions (Mannan, 2005) and that an energy and 
momentum model is suitable for confined explosions (Baker et al., 1983). When considering 
missiles caused by rotating equipment the fragment velocity is often simplified as the 
maximum tangential velocity of the rotating part alternatively calculated by the conservation 
of kinetic energy of the rotor (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013).  
 
The fragmentation patterns and the probable dimensions of the missiles are often based on 
statistical data for vessels or rotors similar to the one that is analysed (Reniers & Cozzani, 
2013). There are some different models available to analyse the impact probability. 
Hauptmanns et al. (2001) have created a model based on trajectory analysis accompanied by 
Monte Carlo simulations, but the model focuses on human impact and is therefore not 
adaptable to property damage and domino effects. Another approach with emphasis on the 
probability of domino effects has been provided by Gubinelli et al. (2004). The method is 
based on ballistic analysis of the possible trajectories of the fragments and has been validated 
against accidental data (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013).  
 
The target damage caused by a missile can be a perforation (the missile penetrates all the way 
through the shell), an embedment (the missile stop before complete penetration) or a ricochet 
(the missile bounces back against the shelter) (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). There are many 
factors affecting the behaviour of the missile and the impact on the target, resulting in a large 
span of possible travel distances and damages. Parameters that affect the fracture propagation 
and secondary damage potential are: the velocity of the missile, the dimensions, density, 
elasticity and robustness of both the missile and the target (ibid.). The probability of 
perforation is higher for small missiles, often originated from rotating equipment, than in the 
case of large fragments (ibid.). Vessel failure often results in quite large fragments that travel 
in a relatively low pace, most frequently resulting in plastic deformation of the target (ibid.). 
The literature gives several calculation models for the penetration scenario, most frequently 
developed through fitting of experimental data, which are reviewed by Mannan (2005), but 
the plastic deformation is more difficult to model. There are models used in other fields that 
simulate impulse loads on structures by finite element analysis, but they have not been 
applied in the process industry to any great extent, mostly due to the variance of the 
conditions for different scenarios (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). 
 
The above described steps needed for the assessment of missile projections should be seen as 
guidance for how such aspects can be taken into account in the proposed method and which 
models that can be used. However, the information given in this section should only be seen 
as an overview of the existing models that can be used for such assessments. In order to gain 
more detailed knowledge concerning the models and the uncertainties associated with them, 
the reader is referred to the originating sources found in literature.    
 
4.3 Damage assessment for equipments exposed to external loads 
The proposed method is dependent of simplified tools that enable the probability of damage 
for target equipments exposed to external loads to be calculated (box 5) and escalation 
threshold values for the assessment of whether escalation is possible or not (box 1, 2 and 3). If 
target equipment suffers damage, different damage state and loss intensity classes can be used 
as support when estimating secondary accident scenarios (box 6). The following sections aim 
to give the reader the proper knowledge, enabling these steps to be performed.  
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When considering the risk of domino effects it is not only the external loads received by 
target equipments that are of interest to analyse. The characteristics of target equipments also 
have great impact on the escalation probability and the severity of sequential accident 
scenarios. After the escalation vectors have been calculated the next step is therefore to 
analyse how it will affect the target equipment. Different models are available for the analysis 
of the impact on target equipments, static methods or simple analytical methods such as the 
Single Degree Of Freedom (SDOF) or Multi Degree Of Freedom (MDOF) are two commonly 
used models used for such analysis (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). In recent years computational 
codes for Finite Element Analysis (FEA) have been developed, which enables a more detailed 
structural analysis. When taking domino effects into account during a QRA even the most 
simplified methods for impact analysis, like the SDOF, are generally too time-consuming 
(ibid.).  
 
To overcome the limits concerning the time available for impact analysis, a threshold based 
approach is often used when analysing domino effects. From historical accidental data, 
threshold values for different types of equipment categories have been estimated. Several 
attempts in defining thresholds have been made, see table 3, however, the proposed values are 
associated with a high degree of uncertainty, which in turn leads to results with large 
variation. More specifically, this has lead to safety distances that vary from tens of meters to 
several hundred meters (Cozzani et al., 2006). The origin of the threshold values showed in 
table 3 is presented in Appendix B.  
 
Table  3. Escalation thresholds reported in literature (Cozzani et al., 2006). 
Escalation Vector  Threshold   Equipment Category Reference 
 
Radiation (kW/m2 
 
9.5  
 
All 
 
Tan (1967) 
 12.5  All DM 151/2001 
 15.6  All API RP 510 (1990) 
 24.0  All Bagster and Pitblado (1991) 
 25.0  All Van den Bosh et al. (1989) 
 37.0  All Khan and Abbasi (1998) 
 37.5  All HSE (1978) 
 37.5  All BS 5908 (1990) 
 37.5  All Mecklenburgh (1985) 
 38.0  All Kletz (1980) 
Overpressure (kPa) 7.0  Atmospheric Gledhill and Lines (1998) 
 10.0  Atmospheric Barton (1995) 
 10.0  Atmospheric Bottelberghs and Ale (1996) 
 10.0  Atmospheric Kletz (1980) 
 14.0  Atmospheric Gugan (1979) 
 20.3  Atmospheric Brasie and Simpson (1968) 
 20.7  Atmospheric Clancey (1972) 
 23.8  Atmospheric Glasstone (1980) 
 30.0  All DM 151/2001 
 30.0  Pressurized Bottelberghs and Ale (1996) 
 35.0  All Wells (1980) 
 35.0  All Gledhill and Lines (1998) 
 38.0  Pressurised  Bagster and Pitblado (1991) 
 42.0  Pressurised  Cozzani and Salzano (2004c) 
 55.0  Pressurised  Glasstone (1980) 
 65.0  Pressurised Brasie and Simpson (1968) 
 70.0  All Khan and Abbasi (1998) 
Fragments (m) 800.0  All DM 151/2001 
 1150.0  All Tan (1967) 
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The escalation threshold values are easy to use, but such approach leads to a deterministic 
estimation and does not consider that different load intensities are more or less likely to lead 
to escalation. Another approach is the use of simplified vulnerability models correlated as 
probit functions. The advantages of these vulnerability models compared to the threshold 
based approach are that the probability of escalation can be quantified and that the 
characteristics of the specific equipment can be taken into account (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). 
Based on the fact that the proposed method has been developed to enable the risk of domino 
effects to be analysed quantitatively within the timeframe associated with a QRA, 
vulnerability models are recommended for the calculation of damage probability for target 
equipments exposed to overpressure.  
 
The probit function is an analytical equation, based on the sigmoidal shaped dose-response 
curve. The function is used to make dose-response relationships more practical to use, this by 
converting the curve into a straight line. Probit functions can be used for a variety of 
exposure, including the exposure of pressure and radiation (CCPS, 1999). Probit functions for 
the probit variable, , based on the dose of exposure,  , can generally be described as the 
following: 
 
                 (Eq. 1) 
 
Where   and   are the probit coefficients used to fit the function against experimental data. 
To transfer the probit variable gained from the function to a probability value either 
conversion tables or equation 2 can be used (CCPS, 1999). 
 
  
 
   
      
  
 
 
   
  
           (Eq. 2) 
 
Where   is the probability,   is the probit variable and   is an integration variable.   is 
normally distributed with a mean value of 5 and a standard deviation of 1. When analysing 
domino effects, probit functions can be used to assess the vulnerability of equipments due to 
the exposure of overpressure and radiation (CCPS, 1999). In 1975 Eisenberg et al. (1975) 
defined a probit function that correlated equipment damage to the peak static overpressure. 
Ever since then, research on developing better correlated probit functions has been performed. 
Nowadays, probit functions for the assessment of vulnerability for a various range of process 
equipment due to exposure of radiation and overpressure are available in literature.   
 
Damage to process equipment is due to the exposure of different escalation vectors: heat 
radiation, overpressure and fragments projection. The escalation is both influenced by the 
specific features of the escalation vectors and by the design features of the target equipment 
(Cozzani et al., 2006). In order to obtain reliable vulnerability models and a set of escalation 
threshold values, these specific features need to be analysed. By taking different levels of 
exposure intensities into account when estimating the damage probability on target 
equipment, it is possible to quantify the consequence that follows escalation. Different levels 
of loss intensities are strongly linked to the damage state of the target equipment, why it 
would be beneficial to define a correlation between the two.       
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4.3.1 Damage states and loss intensity classes  
Different intensities of loss of containments are associated with different damage states (DS). 
Defining different damage states and how they are linked to different classes of loss of 
containment enables the consequences of the secondary scenario to be assessed quantitatively. 
Thus, the definition of loss intensity classes (LI) and their association to respective DS 
category are an important element in the framework for risk assessment of domino effects 
(Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). It also enables an easier estimation of the cost associated to 
damage on equipment, which in turn can be used to assess process downtime. In literature, 
damage state categories are often defined as: 
 
 DS1: light damage to the structure or to the auxiliary equipment.  
 
 DS2: intense or catastrophic damage, which is certainly followed by an intense loss of 
containment.  
 
As stated earlier, different types of loss of containment may follow DS1 and DS2. There are 
many factors affecting the severity of a loss of containment, mainly the release flow, which in 
turn is influenced by the physical properties and the condition of the fluid in the vessel. 
Following the approach described in the Purple book (2005), three classes of loss intensities 
can be defined: 
 
 LI1: minor loss, defined as the partial loss of inventory or total loss of inventory in a 
time interval of more than 10 min. 
 
 LI2: intense loss, defined as the total loss of inventory within 10 min. 
 
 LI3: catastrophic loss, defined as the instantaneous loss of inventory. 
 
When defining LI classes caution should be taken, especially when a high number of LI 
classes are proposed, this because a more detailed analysis demands actual damage data or 
structural modelling to be justified (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). The correlation between LI 
classes and DS categories is defined in table 4, the definitions presented are commonly used 
in various literature and are based on research of previous accidents.  
 
Table  4. Loss of intensities classes and damage states categories (Cozzani et al., 2006). 
Structural 
damage 
Loss of 
containment 
Secondary events for flammable materials 
  Equipment 
 
   
  Atmospheric Pressurized Elongated Small 
 
DS1 
 
LI1 
 
Minor pool 
fire 
 
Minor jet fire 
 
 
Minor pool fire 
Minor flash fire 
 
Minor pool fire 
Minor flash fire 
 
DS2 
 
LI2 
 
Pool fire 
Flash fire 
VCE 
 
 
Jet fire  
Flash fire 
VCE 
 
Pool fire 
Flash fire 
VCE 
 
Minor pool fire 
Minor flash fire 
DS2 LI3 Pool fire 
Flash fire 
VCE 
BLEVE/fireball 
Flash fire 
VCE 
Pool fire 
Flash fire 
VCE 
Minor pool fire 
Minor flash fire 
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4.3.2 Heat loads 
Cozzani et al. (2006) state that three factors, except from the radiation intensity, should be 
taken into account when defining escalation thresholds due to exposure of heat loads: the 
possible specific effect of fire impingement and engulfment, the time evolution and the 
characteristics of the secondary target. The straightforward approach is to compare the heat 
load and duration generated by the primary scenario with the time to failure (ttf) of the target 
equipment. The ttf in turn depends on the target equipment design: shell thickness, 
atmospheric or pressurized vessel, volume of the tank, etc. The presence of active and passive 
protection system is also a contributing factor, water deluges, thermal insulation and relief 
valves for example. The position of the primary accident relative to the target equipment is 
also of importance; the targeted equipment may be partially or fully engulfed by a fire, a 
flame impingement may be present or heat radiation may come from a distant source 
(Cozzani et al., 2006).  
 
Extensive research on the time to failure for different process equipments is available in 
literature. The research conducted by Cozzani et al. (2006) constitute one example; these 
authors defined an extensive set of representative scenarios, using input vessel data from well 
recognized standards and codes. The authors simulated the vessel wall temperature and 
internal pressure build up for different heat loads, which allowed them to estimate the ttf for 
each representative scenario. The simulations were conducted using a lumped-parameters 
model, and a sensitivity analysis of all factors affecting the escalation possibility was also 
conducted. The research allowed the authors to correlate representative vulnerability models 
for the estimation of damage to different equipment categories. For detailed information 
regarding the reference vessels and scenarios, readers are referred to Cozzani et al. (2005, 
2006). Further, Landucci et al. (2009a) revised the study of Cozzani et al. (2006) and 
validated the lumped-parameters approach by comparing the ttf values from the lumped 
model with ttf values from a finite element model (FEM) and real life experiments. The 
validation shows that the lumped model gives credible and conservative values, with a 15 % 
average relative error on the safe side. These authors also introduced a dependency of vessel 
volume to improve the estimation of the ttf, which resulted in updated vulnerability models, 
as presented in table 5.  
 
Table  5. Probit functions for the calculation of damage probability of equipments exposed to radiation;  
    [s]; I [kW/m2]; V [m3] (Landucci et al., 2009a) 
Equipment category Probit function 
 
Atmospheric vessel 
(25 – 17 500 m3, 0.1 MPa)  
 
               
   
    
 
 
                                   
 
Pressurized vessel  
(5-250 m
3
, 1.5-2.5 MPa)                       
   
     
 
Distant source radiation                                         
 
 
Engulfed by flames                                                 
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The above correlations are based on Landucci et al. (2009a) method for making the probit 
function more site-specific. These authors state that the probability of damage is dependent on 
the time to failure (ttf) and that the probit coefficients,   and  , are dependent of the time 
required to start emergency operations (    ) and the maximum time required to start 
mitigation actions (    ). Based on a survey conducted on multiple oil refineries, the time 
needed for the arrival of the internal emergency team and for them to start mitigating actions 
could be estimated. A rough distribution could be derived showing that only in 10 % of the 
cases the cooling could start in less than 5 minutes and in 90 % in less than 20 minutes 
(Landucci et al., 2009a). This information enabled the authors to derive the probit constants,   
and  , using equation 5 and 6. These probit constants can be seen as generalised values and 
may be adapted if site-specific information is missing (ibid.).  
 
  
                                   
                   
       (Eq. 3) 
 
  
               
                   
         (Eq. 4) 
 
Readers should note that the above correlations shall be seen as a conservative estimation of 
the actual ttf, as the vulnerability models are based on the lowest ttf for each analysed 
scenario. However, they are still useful in a QRA framework because they allow the 
possibility for escalation to be calculated within a reasonable timeframe. The results show that 
the ttf of any atmospheric vessel exposed to distant radiation intensity lower than 15 kW/m
2
 
was higher than 10 minutes and for radiation intensity lower than 10 kW/m
2
 the ttf was higher 
than 30 minutes. In the case of pressurised vessels, the ttf resulted in higher than 10 minutes 
for a distant radiation intensity of 60 kW/m
2
 and higher than 30 minutes for radiation intensity 
lower than 45 kW/m
2
. Readers should note that the ttf for pressurised vessel is dependent on 
the design pressure, which was between 1,5 and 2,5 MPa. The authors did not include any 
active or passive protection systems in their analysis so these results should be considered 
rather conservative, especially for pressurised vessels, where thermal protections as 
fireproofing material and active mitigation systems as water deluges often are present 
(Reniers & Cozzani, 2013).  
 
Recently, real life experiments have been made to see how thermal protective coatings affect 
the time to failure for pressurised vessels. The results from experiments made by Landucci et 
al. (2009b) evidence that thermal protective coating has a significant impact on the time to 
failure. The ttf resulted in over 100 minutes when a pressurised vessel 3m
3
 with thermal 
protective coating was fully engulfed to fire with a flame emissive power of 110 kW/m
2
 
(Landucci et al., 2009b). Reniers and Cozzani (2013) have compiled the results from different 
experiments with coated pressurised vessels, showing a minimum ttf of 94 minutes. This can 
be compared to ttfs ranging from 4 up to 30 minutes for unprotected pressurised vessels 
(Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). Based on these experimental results the impact of radiation on 
pressurised vessels with thermal coating can be neglected when analysing the possibility of 
domino effects. Atmospheric tanks have considerably lower shell thickness compared to 
pressurised vessel, which make them more vulnerable to exposure of heat loads. The results 
from Cozzani et al. (2006) study shows that atmospheric vessels are likely to burst within 
times varying from 100 – 200 seconds when exposed to radiation levels between 60-90 
kW/m
2
.  Based on this fact and that pool fires often have flame surface emissive powers 
ranging from 120 – 170 kW/m2, depending on the substance, atmospheric tanks impinged or 
engulfed by fire are assumed to have an escalation probability of 1.   
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As stated before, different loss intensities (LI) may follow different damage states (DS). To 
enable a domino sequence to be analysed in a quantified way, both the probability for 
escalation (vulnerability models) and the consequences (DS and LI) that may follow 
escalation need to be evaluated. In studies by Cozzani et al. (2006), Landucci et al. (2009a) 
and Antonioni et al. (2009), efforts have been made to evaluate the consequences due to the 
exposure of different kinds of escalation vectors and heat loads. Which LI classes that should 
be addressed due to different levels of radiation intensities are presented in table 6.  
 
Table  6. Threshold values for different equipment categories associated to DS and LI classes due to the 
exposure of heat loads (Antonioni et al., 2009; Cozzani et al., 2006; Landucci et al., 2009a). 
 
Scenario 
 
Escalation vector 
 
Threshold values (kW/m
2
) 
 
Consequence 
  Pressurised tanks Atmospheric tanks  
Fireball  
Radiation 
 
 
Flame engulfment  
 
      
      
 
      
      
 
 
      
      
 
      
      
 
 
DS1LI 1 
No consequence 
 
DS1LI 1 
No consequence  
Jet fire Fire impingement  
 
Radiation 
 
     
 
    ;       
    ;       
     
 
     
 
    ;       
   ;       
    
 
DS2LI 3 
 
DS2LI 2 
DS1LI 1 
No consequence 
Flash fire Fire impingement Unlikely Unlikely No consequence 
 
Pool fire 
 
Flame engulfment 
 
Radiation 
 
     
 
    ;       
    ;       
     
 
     
 
    ;       
   ;       
    
 
DS2LI 3 
 
DS2LI 2 
DS1LI 1 
No consequence 
 
dj; jet length, dp; pool diameter, d; distance between tanks, tj; duration of jet fire [min], tp; duration of pool fire 
[min] 
 
However, these threshold values have been asserted to cover a big range of vessel volumes 
and shell thicknesses, as reported in the study by Cozzani et al. (2006). Looking at the 
proposed threshold value of radiation intensities equal to or higher than 15 kW/m
2
, the time 
varies from 585 s to 940 s with vessel volumes ranging from 25 m
3 
to 17 500 m
3
. This 
indicates that the ttf varies significantly with specific vessel volumes and that one should 
verify that the duration of exposure is longer than the specific ttf.  
33 
 
4.3.3 Overpressure loads    
For each primary scenario that may cause an explosion, the expected damage due to 
overpressure on the target equipment is mainly dependent on the peak static overpressure and 
of the features of the equipment. Other influential factors are: the dynamic overpressure, the 
rise time of the positive phase of the wave and the total impulse, as well as reflections of the 
pressure wave, flow separation, the geometry and relative position of the loaded equipment 
(Baker et al., 1983). These factors are though often neglected in analyses. An analysis of the 
effect of an explosion is linked with a high degree of complexity, and the consequences are 
hardly predictable by a deterministic approach (Cozzani et al., 2006). However, when far field 
interactions between the explosion source and the targeted equipment are of concern, or when 
relatively low pressure explosion with a maximum peak static overpressure lower than 50 kPa 
are considered, the damage caused by a blast wave can be effectively correlated to the peak 
static overpressure (Cozzani et al., 2006).  
 
In a study by Cozzani et al. (2006), which is a revision from Cozzani and Salzano (2004a,b,c)  
previous work, the authors have analysed a wide range of damage threshold for the peak static 
overpressure, which allowed them to correlate probit functions and define threshold values for 
a number of category equipment. For detailed information concerning the input that has been 
used, the reader is referred to Cozzani and Salzano (2004a,b,c). The available data, allowed 
damage threshold values to be defined for four representative equipment categories: 
atmospheric vessels, pressurized vessels, elongated equipment and small equipment. It should 
be remarked that the reported structural damage threshold may not be correspondent to 
threshold values related to the escalation of accidental scenarios. Although any damage to 
equipment can result in a domino effect, the likelihood of escalation is strongly dependent on 
the intensity of damage and of the construction of the target equipment (ibid.). Hence, the 
features of potential secondary scenarios must be analysed and taken into account when 
defining escalation thresholds. By dividing the reference data into different damage states 
(DS) and different classes of loss of containment (LI), as described earlier in this chapter, 
Cozzani et al. (2006) could perform a more accurate analysis of the escalation thresholds. 
However, the authors only assigned four damage probability values (1%, 10%, 30% and 99%) 
on the entire probability range (0-100 %). This approach lead to damage values with great 
deviation being assigned to the same damage probability, which of course is not optimal. 
Mingguang and Juncheng (2008) have revised the study by Cozzani et al. (2006), taking into 
account the whole probability range. With the same categories of damage states and classes of 
loss of intensity that are described in section 4.3.1, the probability range could be divided in 
three correspondent probability ranges: 
 
 The range of 0-30% was assumed to correspond to DS1LI1 
 The range of 30-70% was assumed to correspond to DS2LI2 
 The range of 70-100 % was assumed to correspond to DS2LI3 
 
This approach allowed the deviation between overpressure values and probability values to be 
greatly mitigated, which can be observed in table 7.   
 
Table  7. Comparison of mean square error and regression coefficients (Mingguang & Juncheng, 2008). 
Category of equipment Cozzani et al.  Mingguang and Juncheng 
 Regression 
coefficients  
Mean square 
error (%) 
 Regression 
coefficients  
Mean square 
error (%) 
 
Atmospheric 
 
0.573 
 
55.9 
  
0.905 
 
14.1 
Pressurized 0.852 52.5  0.844 13.9 
Elongated equipments 0.690 5.3  0.786 9.4 
Small equipments 0.776 42.8  0.826 11.2 
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The better fitted model allowed new probit functions to be derived by a least square 
regression analysis and escalation thresholds values to be determined, which are presented in 
table 8 and 9.  
 
Table  8. Probit functions derived for four different equipment categories (Mingguang & Juncheng, 2008).  
Equipment category Probit function 
 
Atmospheric 
 
                    
Pressurized                      
Elongated equipments                      
Small equipments                      
 
 
Table  9. Threshold values for different equipment categories associated with DS and LI classes due to exposure 
of overpressure (Mingguang & Juncheng, 2008). 
 
Escalation 
Vector 
 
Threshold values (kPa) 
 
Consequence 
 Pressurised  
tanks 
Atmospheric 
tanks 
Elongated 
equipments 
Small 
equipments 
 
 
Overpressure  
 
∆Pa>58 
58≥∆Pa>32 
32≥∆Pa≥18 
∆Pa<18 
 
 
∆Pa>33 
33≥∆Pa>15 
15≥∆Pa≥8 
∆Pa<8 
 
 
∆Pa>46 
46≥∆Pa>24 
24≥∆Pa≥16 
∆Pa<16 
 
 
∆Pa>56 
56≥∆Pa>29 
29≥∆Pa≥22 
∆Pa<22 
 
 
DS2LI3 
DS2LI2 
DS1LI1 
No 
consequence 
 
4.3.4 Impact of fragment projection  
All types of mechanical explosions and BLEVEs can lead to fragment projections, the 
fragment number, shapes and weights are in turn mainly dependent on the characteristics of 
the vessel that undergoes fragmentation (Cozzani et al., 2006). It is the availability of internal 
energy, usually in the form of internal pressure, which can propagate cracks in the vessel 
shell, leading to fragmentation, and be partly converted into kinetic energy of the fragments 
(Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). Damage and escalation caused by fragment projection require two 
conditions: the distance of the target equipment must be lower than the maximum credible 
projection distance and the impact must be followed by a loss of containment. Historical 
analysis shows that projection and impact of fragments is a credible cause of escalation. The 
escalation mechanism is complex, involving three main phases: fragment formation, fragment 
ejection and flight and damage from fragment impact (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). By a 
probabilistic approach Cozzani et al. (2006) analysed the phenomena, and stated that the 
impact probability could conservatively be estimated to          at 100 meters and     
     at 300 meters. The deterministic safety distance for escalation due to fragment 
projection of a BLEVE or a mechanical explosion may be higher than 1000 meters (Cozzani 
et al., 2006). The suggested safety distance can be compared with the distance of 900 meters, 
which has been observed in past accidents involving commonly used storage vessels. 
 
Due to the fact that fragment projection is linked with such a high degree of complexity, it is 
almost impossible to draw any generalised conclusion regarding the impact of the 
phenomenon and how often it is likely to occur. Looking at the statistical analysis in appendix 
A, fragment projection can be correlated as an effect from a BLEVE. In 84 percent of the 
cases where fragment projection occurred, BLEVE was the initiating event. Based on that 
fact, it seems reasonable to neglect fragment projection from the analysis if BLEVE is not 
deemed as a credible scenario. As defined in table 4, a BLEVE is deemed possible to occur 
only in the case of secondary consequences in form of a total collapse of structure followed 
by a complete loss of inventory in less than a minute (DS2LI3).  
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4.4 Approaches to the frequency analysis of domino accidents 
The following sections serve to give the reader understanding of how the frequency 
assessment of domino scenarios should be performed accordingly to the proposed method. 
Two methods developed for the analysis of complex systems, which more recently have been 
recognised to be applicable for the frequency analysis of domino scenarios are: Bayesian 
network analysis and Monte Carlo simulations, and are described in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. 
Two more conventional approaches are the event and fault tree analyses, which are elaborated 
on in the next section. Regardless of which analysis technique that is being adopted, the 
process in which domino effects can be accounted for in a QRA is still the same. It all boils 
down to investigate if there are any target equipments that may be damaged by an escalation 
vector following an initial accident, estimate the probability of damage for each target 
equipment and the potential secondary accident scenarios that may follow. For higher levels 
of escalation, this process is repeated and continues until all final outcomes have been 
identified.   
 
The conventional QRA process leads to the identification of relevant final outcomes and an 
assessment of their frequency (   ). The given frequency can be used to calculate the 
frequency of single escalation events (   ) (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013): 
 
                      (Eq. 5) 
 
Where     and     are measured in events per year and    is the escalation     probability 
given that the primary event      occurs (ibid.): 
 
                   (Eq. 6) 
 
The probability of escalation can be assessed using relevant probit functions for equipment 
damage. A condition for the validity of the presented equations is that the primary and 
secondary event can be assumed to be mutually exclusive from a probabilistic viewpoint, 
meaning that they only occur at the same time if an escalation takes place (Reniers & 
Cozzani, 2013).  
 
 
4.4.1 Frequency assessment based on event or fault tree analysis  
In a conventional QRA framework, the frequency is often calculated through fault tree 
analysis, event tree analysis or a combination of the two approaches, called bow-tie analysis. 
These approaches are also applicable to the frequency analysis of domino scenarios, however 
increases the workload substantially when including probabilities for escalation. In a complex 
system a single starting event may lead to several secondary events and every secondary event 
can lead to events on a higher level. Thus, really large event trees for each primary scenario 
can be anticipated and given the fact that a substantial number of primary scenarios can be 
expected within process industries, it is easy to grasp that the frequency analysis of domino 
scenarios can get out of proportion. These kinds of analyses have earlier been difficult or even 
impossible to perform due to lack of computer capacity, but in recent years the computational 
development has made it possible to analyse the frequency of domino scenarios with these 
kinds of analysis techniques (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013).  
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As stated, the most intuitive and recommended approach for frequency analysis of the chain 
of events is to perform event tree analysis for each representative scenario, enabling all final 
outcomes to be identified. Thus can the impact of all events that can trigger escalation to 
nearby units be accounted for, leading to a more realistic assessment of the accident scenarios. 
To avoid ending up in a circular reference, scenarios are only allowed to propagate to units 
that poses a greater threat to the surrounding area. This means that the overall consequences 
following propagation needs to be increased compared to the consequence of the initial 
accident scenario. In cases where multiple units can be exposed to external loads 
simultaneously it is important that all potential chain of events that may follow the primary 
accident are analysed, starting from the unit having the greatest escalation potential and then 
working down the ladder to units with lower domino risk ranking. Otherwise, the risk may be 
overestimated. From a probabilistic point of view this means that each chain of events should 
be analysed starting with the unit having the highest domino risk ranking (DRR), as shown in 
figure 9.  
 
   
 
  
  
An alternative approach to the event tree analysis would be to identify critical units that if 
involved in an accident would lead to severe consequences. By performing fault tree analysis, 
where each critical unit are seen as a top event, the frequency of these high severity accidents 
can be updated with regard to the risk of domino effects. Further, the risk of escalation to 
other parts or plants can be estimated by event tree analysis. The overall risk associated to 
each chain of events can thereby be estimated by bow-tie analysis. 
 
4.4.2 Frequency assessment by Bayesian network analysis 
Bayesian network analysis is a tool for reasoning under uncertainty and to model a system of 
dependencies (Bobbio et al., 2001). One of the advantages of the Bayesian network approach 
is that it is flexible and that it is easy to update the initial values if new information is 
obtained, this by using the Bayes theorem (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). By mapping fault trees 
into a Bayesian network, the dependencies between the different units and the uncertainties in 
the system can be better captured than in a conventional fault tree analysis. This is mainly due 
to the fact that the Bayesian network is built on probabilistic dependencies while the fault tree 
analysis only can handle deterministic dependencies (Bobbio et al., 2001).  
 
When mapping process plants into the Bayesian network, the plant is modelled as a system of 
variables; usually each unit or equipment item is seen as a variable defined as a node. The 
different nodes are connected by directed arcs which represent their dependencies.  
The different nodes are divided into child and parent nodes, where child nodes are nodes to 
which arcs are directed and parent nodes are nodes from which arcs are directed. A node can 
be both a child and a parent node at the same time. Nodes without any parent nodes are called 
root nodes and nodes without any children are called leaf nodes.  
 
DRR 2 DRR 3 
No             
No            
Initial accident scenario 
DRR 1 
Yes        
No           
Yes         
Yes         
Figure 9. The probabilistic approach for the event tree analysis of each chain of event with regard to the 
domino risk ranking (DRR).  
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The Bayesian network estimates the probability distribution for the system by multiplying the 
probabilities of connected parents for each node (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). A schematic 
sketch of a Bayesian network is presented in figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
4.4.3 Frequency assessment by Monte Carlo simulation  
Monte Carlo simulations have had a great influence on the computational fields the latest 
years. These types of simulation are often used when the underlying probabilities are known 
but the interactions in the system are hard to specify (Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010). When 
dealing with domino effects in the process industry this is often the case, due to the 
complexity of the system, and the method is therefore suitable also in this field according to 
Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2010). The simulation technique is an iterative process where the 
inputs are sets of random numbers. Two kinds of probabilities need to be set before doing the 
simulation, the primary accident probabilities and the escalation probabilities 
(Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010).  
 
The primary accident probability can be obtained by performing an event tree or fault tree 
analysis, alternatively from generic data. The probability of escalation is often obtained by 
probit models. These probabilities are set as inputs to the model. Depending on the 
complexity of the system that is examined the number of runs, normally in the order of 
thousands, can be set, where a system associated with a large amount of uncertainties should 
be analysed by a large amount of runs (Rezaie et al., 2007). For each variable a distribution is 
assigned and every run results in a stochastic value for each variable, which is assigned within 
the boundaries of the distribution (ibid.). The underlying utility amount is then based on these 
values. In addition to the mentioned strengths of the approach, a weakness is that it does not 
consider dependencies between the uncertainties, which in the case of domino effects are an 
important factor (ibid.). Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2010) have developed an algorithm for 
multi-unit systems under influence of domino effects, called FREEDOM. The outcome from 
the algorithm is the failure frequency and it is based on hypothetical experiments containing 
domino effects.  
 
  
Figure 10. A schematic sketch of a Bayesian network 
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4.5 Summary of the proposed tools and models 
With aid of the tools presented in the previous sections, damage probability and secondary 
accident scenarios can be analysed for target equipments found within the effect zone of a 
primary accident. The escalation threshold values reported in this chapter may represent a 
starting point for the quantitative analysis of domino scenarios in a QRA framework. The 
failure of equipment is dependent on the conditions at hand and as seen in literature, there are 
many different proposed threshold values. Therefore, it is important to state that the threshold 
values described in this chapter only represents guiding values, which may be updated to be 
more site-specific if such information is available. The threshold values for different damage 
state and loss intensities should be seen as input when defining accident scenarios following 
escalation. However, it is crucial to have knowledge of the physical aspects concerning the 
different phenomena giving rise to escalation and the parameters affecting the final outcome, 
as described in above sections.   
 
The vulnerability models used for the calculation of damage on equipment are simplified 
correlations of a much more complex process, thus the results should be seen as a rough 
representation of the reality. Due to the conservative approach that has been used when 
correlating these models they provide results on the safe side, which makes them suitable for 
a QRA. The results may even be seen as over conservative as no safety systems, active or 
passive, have been taken into consideration when developing the models. Due to that fact, the 
impact of safety systems needs to be analysed separately, allowing the damage probability to 
be updated with regard to these results so that a more realistic risk profile can be compiled.    
 
The proposed method has been developed to be applicable, regardless of which consequence 
and frequency analysis models that are being used. Therefore, the models can be chosen 
depending on the purpose and the complexity of the analysis. 
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5. CASE STUDY 
The objective of the case study is to apply the developed method on a real case and to 
evaluate how well it is applicable in practice. The present case study has its baseline in 
analysing a part within the Preemraff plant located in Lysekil. During a site visit a guided tour 
around the premises and relevant input data, such as process conditions and dimensions, was 
given. This information represents the baseline of the analysis. When analysing the chain of 
events, the computational software program Phast Risk version 6.7 has been applied. In order 
to easy the workload, some steps of the proposed method have been incorporated into the 
program, why it may be difficult to follow every step of the method described in the 
flowchart. However, during the case study three accident scenarios will be presented in detail 
in order to give the reader a deeper understanding of how the proposed method has been 
applied. For all other accident scenarios, only the results from the analysis of the chain of 
events will be presented, this in order to keep the magnitude of the report within the defined 
limits, given by the Division of Risk Management and Societal Safety. Readers should note 
that if nothing else is stated, all assumptions made in the following sections are based on the 
authors own reasoning.  
 
5.1 Scope and context 
The area of interest is the Vapour Recovery Unit (VRU) and the pipe bridge, as shown in 
figure 11 the two parts are situated close by each other why the risk of domino effect is 
interesting to analyse. The VRU and the pipe bridge are seen as two separate subsystems. The 
analysis has its base on investigating if domino effects can occur between the different parts 
of the VRU. The risk of propagation to other parts of the plant following accidents within the 
VRU is also analysed. Finally, it is of interest to analyse if equipments outside the subsystem 
of the VRU can inflict damage to any of the parts of the VRU, for this purpose accident 
scenarios that originate from the pipe bridge are analysed.  
 
 
Figure 11. Overview of the area chosen for the case study. 
 
The risk of domino effects is highly influenced by the relative distance between the primary 
accident and the different target equipments. The relative distances between the different parts 
of the VRU and to the pipe bridge are presented in figure 12.  
VRU 
Pipe bridge 
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Figure 12. Relative distances for the parts of the VRU. 
 
5.1.1 VRU 
The purpose of the VRU is to recover vapour emissions generated during ship loading. The 
VRU reduces the emissions of green house gases significantly and regenerates gasoline at a 
low cost. A simplified flowchart describing this regeneration process is presented in figure 13. 
 
 
Switching valves 
Clean air exhaust 
Adsorber Adsorber 
Vacuum  
pump 
Absorption 
column 
Pump 
Pump 
Pump 
Inlet of gas/air mixture 
Loading  
line 
Purge air 
Switching valves 
Separator 
Figure 13. Simplified flowchart describing the vapour recovery process. 
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The first step in the process is that the gaseous emissions produced during loading are 
gathered by an unloading arm and further transported to the VRU by pipelines. At every 
loading arm there is a detonation arrester installed and further, another detonation arrester is 
located at the entry point to the VRU. These arresters do not affect the frequency of accidents, 
they rather mitigate the consequences and the risk of escalation to other installations. The 
piping between the ships and the VRU is also equipped with shut off valves, drains and safety 
valves. In the VRU the incoming flux is led to an adsorption tank containing a bed of 
activated carbon, which adsorbs the hydrocarbon vapour onto its surface while the clean air 
passes through and is vented to the atmosphere by an exhaust. Adsorption of the incoming 
hydrocarbon vapour continues until the bed of activated carbon is completely saturated. The 
adsorption vessel operates at pressures slightly above atmospheric pressure, with temperatures 
close to ambient temperature. As figure 13 describes, the system contains two adsorption 
tanks. The reason for this is that the process shall be able to continue while one of the tanks is 
saturated. Therefore the system is controlled by switching valves, which are set to direct the 
flow to the unsaturated tank while the other one is regenerated.  
 
During the regeneration mode the tank pressure is lowered by four vacuum pumps in order to 
make the conditions favourable for desorption of the hydrocarbon vapour. To modulate the 
highest vacuum level, a small amount of purge air is added to the tank during the last part of 
the regeneration phase. The desorbed vapour is then led to a separator by a stream of seal 
fluid needed for the vacuum system to operate. The seal fluid, hydrocarbon liquid that may 
have condensed while going through the vacuum system and the hydrocarbon vapour is then 
stratified in the separator. The seal fluid is heavier than the condensed liquid and settles to the 
bottom of the tank, where it is re-processed through the vacuum system. The hydrocarbon 
vapour and the condensed liquid then pass through the absorption column, where the 
hydrocarbon vapour is recovered by absorption into a reverse stream of gasoline that is added 
in the top of the absorption column. The gasoline is then pumped back to the loading line, 
while the hydrocarbon vapour that is not absorbed into the gasoline is transferred back to the 
adsorption tanks where it is re-processed.  
 
Within the VRU there are multiple alarms installed, these alarms indicate if the temperature, 
pressure, flow or fill level is lower or higher than in normal operating conditions. Two 
different types of alarm levels are present; high/low level alarm and high high/low low level 
alarm. The two different types of alarms have different set values, where the high high and the 
low low level alarm are set as trip level alarms and if triggered the process will automatically 
shut down, while if the high/low level alarm is triggered it will result in a warning signal. The 
adsorber vessel, separator vessel and the absorption column all have safety vents installed, 
which activates automatically if the pressure rises to a level higher than 6.6 bar. A bund is 
present, separating the adsorber vessels from the other process units. There is also a runoff 
drain with a capacity of 3000 l/min installed in the VRU.   
 
The gasoline vapours, which are being processed in the VRU, are a mix of hydrocarbons 
including alkanes, cycloalkanes, alkenes, and aromatics. Looking at the results from a study 
of emission of gasoline vapours at gas stations in Sweden by Berglund and Petersson (1989), 
alkanes such as methylpropane, butane and methylbutane represent more than 66 percent of 
the vapour percentage weight. The vapour mix is highly combustible and the risk of fire and 
explosion is present during operation mode of the VRU. The gas mixture is within the 
flammability range during the adsorption phase until the moment that the carbon bed has been 
completely saturated. Although the hydrocarbons are outside the flammability range inside 
the adsorber vessel during the regeneration mode, the risk of fire in the carbon bed is still 
present. This due to the fact that spontaneous ignition can occur if air is allowed into the 
adsorber vessel during this phase.  
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In all other units, the gas mixture is above the flammability level, meaning that there is no risk 
for internal explosion in these units. However, any sort of loss of containment is thus likely to 
initiate an accident. As input for the consequence analysis, the characteristics of the units 
within the vapour recovery process are described in table 10. These values were given during 
the site visit.  
 
Table  10. Characteristics of the units within the vapour recovery process.  
Unit Vessel type Volume 
[m
3
] 
Substance  
property  
Overpressure 
[bar] 
Temperature 
[°C] 
Fill level 
[%] 
Adsorber 
vessel 
Pressurised 126 Gas 0.1 20 100 
Separator 
vessel 
Pressurised 19 Gas 0.1 20 100 
Absorption 
column 
Pressurised 22 Liquid 0 20 40 
Heat 
exchanger 
Pressurised 6 Liquid 0 20 30 
 
5.1.2 Pipe bridge 
Many transporting pipelines are present within the industry, this to enable effective linkages 
between the different parts of the system. The pipe bridge situated close to the VRU consists 
of 19 pipes, many of which transporting flammable substances, which can cause domino 
effects if leak or rupture scenarios occur. The close relative position implies that damage to 
units in the VRU cannot be excluded from scenarios originating in the pipe bridge, and there 
is also risk of damage to the pipes if an accident occurs in the VRU. The three pipelines 
situated closest to the VRU contain liquefied natural gas (LNG). Due to the fact that the 
purpose of the case study is to examine how well the method is applicable in practice, not the 
specific results, and that the LNG pipelines will partly shelter the VRU if accidents occur in 
one of the other pipes, the case study is delimited to only analyse the VRU and the LNG 
pipelines. The characteristics of the LNG pipelines, which were given during the site visit, are 
presented in table 11. 
 
 
Table  11. The LNG pipelines analysed.  
Pipe  Substance 
property 
Diameter 
[mm] 
Length [m]  
 
1 
 
Liquid 
 
300 
 
1000 
 
2 
3 
Liquid 
Gas 
50 
300 
1000 
1000 
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5.1.3 Escalation threshold values used in the analysis 
As the method states, it is crucial to define escalation threshold values to enable analysis of 
damage on target equipments. All potential damage states and loss intensity classes are of 
interest in this case study, why threshold values for DS1LI1, DS2LI2 and DS2LI3 are used in 
the analysis. These classes are defined as: 
 
 DS1LI1: light damage to the structure or to the auxiliary equipment, followed by a 
partial or total loss of inventory within a time interval of more than 10 minutes.  
 
 DS2LI2: intense or catastrophic damage, which is followed by a total loss of inventory 
within 10 minutes. 
 
 DS2LI2: intense or catastrophic damage, which is followed by instantaneous loss of 
inventory. 
 
As seen in table 12 and 13, when analysing the risk of domino effects, the threshold value 
should be chosen depending on the characteristics of the target equipment of concern.  
  
Table  12. Threshold values for different equipment categories associated to DS and LI classes due to the 
exposure of heat loads (Antonioni et al., 2009; Cozzani et al., 2006; Landucci et al., 2009a). 
 
Scenario 
 
Escalation vector 
 
Threshold values (kW/m
2
) 
 
Consequence 
  Pressurised tanks Atmospheric tanks  
Fireball  
Radiation 
 
 
Flame engulfment  
 
      
      
 
      
      
 
 
      
      
 
      
      
 
 
DS1LI 1 
No consequence 
 
DS1LI 1 
No consequence  
Jet fire Fire impingement  
 
Radiation 
 
     
 
    ;       
    ;       
     
 
     
 
    ;       
   ;       
    
 
DS2LI 3 
 
DS2LI 2 
DS1LI 1 
No consequence 
Flash fire Fire impingement Unlikely Unlikely No consequence 
 
Pool fire 
 
Flame engulfment 
 
Radiation 
 
     
 
    ;       
    ;       
     
 
     
 
    ;       
   ;       
    
 
DS2LI 3 
 
DS2LI 2 
DS1LI 1 
No consequence 
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Table  13. Threshold values for different equipment categories associated with DS and LI classes due to 
exposure of overpressure (Mingguang & Juncheng, 2008). 
 
Escalation 
Vector 
 
Threshold values (kPa) 
 
Consequence 
 Pressurised  
tanks 
Atmospheric 
tanks 
Elongated 
equipments 
Small 
equipments 
 
 
Overpressure  
 
∆Pa>58 
58≥∆Pa>32 
32≥∆Pa≥18 
∆Pa<18 
 
 
∆Pa>33 
33≥∆Pa>15 
15≥∆Pa≥8 
∆Pa<8 
 
 
∆Pa>46 
46≥∆Pa>24 
24≥∆Pa≥16 
∆Pa<16 
 
 
∆Pa>56 
56≥∆Pa>29 
29≥∆Pa≥22 
∆Pa<22 
 
 
DS2LI3 
DS2LI2 
DS1LI1 
No 
consequence 
 
5.2 Hazard identification  
The hazard identification mainly focuses on identifying risks situated within the VRU. The 
only risk sources except from these, included in the analysis, are the ones located in the pipe 
bridge which are deemed to have the potential to inflict damage on the VRU. Due to the fact 
that the case study mainly is conducted in order to evaluate how well the method is applicable 
in practice, a simplified hazard identification has been performed, why no stakeholders have 
been involved in the process. All potential leak scenarios that may follow a loss of 
containment have been included in the hazard identification. Generic loss of containment 
scenarios have been adopted for this purpose, which is based on the well established RIVM 
(2009) guideline. Readers should note that if nothing else is stated, all assumptions and 
conclusions made in the following sections are based on the authors own reasoning.       
 
5.2.1 VRU process 
Looking at the process flow described in figure 13, a large amount of combustible vapour mix 
is located in the adsorber vessel, separator vessel and absorption column. A loss of 
containment in either one of these vessels is deemed to inflict great damage to property 
situated in the area. If the adsorber vessel is exposed to external heat loads, the hydrocarbons 
will rapidly separate from the active carbon bed, thus leading to a pressure build up and an 
increased temperature within the vessel. The risk of a mechanical explosion in the adsorber 
vessel is thus always deemed as possible in the case of external exposure of heat load, due to 
the fact that one of the two adsorber vessels always is in adsorption mode, meaning that there 
is a flammable gas air mixture present. In scenarios where the separator vessel is being 
exposed to external heat loads, the pressure will increase with the temperature rise. However, 
the gas mixture is not within the flammability range in this vessel, meaning that ignition only 
can occur after a loss of containment where the mixture gets diluted with air. Thus, the 
secondary scenario following exposure of external heat loads is likely to be a fireball or a 
flash fire. The absorption column, which mostly contains gasoline, is likely to burst when 
exposed to external loads, resulting in a pool fire. Malfunctioning of the gasoline pump may 
lead to leakages, thus this pump is recognized as a threat to the safety and included in the 
analysis. Heat exchangers, in the same way as pumps can malfunction, and therefore this unit 
should also be included in the analysis.  
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The initial scenarios chosen for further analysis have been selected with guidance from RIVM 
(2009), which is a reference manual for risk assessment of chemical industries based on the 
Purple book (2005). As the RIVM states, when the lengths of pipelines are below 10 meters, 
the risk of pipe rupture and leakage can be assumed as included in the accident scenarios for 
the connecting equipments. Within the VRU, there are no pipelines with lengths over 10 
metres, thus no pipe leak and rupture scenarios are treated separately in the analysis. The 
scenarios of interest and their estimated frequencies according to RIVM (2009) are presented 
in table 14.  
 
 
Table  14. Representative scenarios chosen for further analysis.  
Unit        Scenario Frequency  
 
Adsorber 
vessel 
 
1. Instantaneous loss of the complete inventory of vapour mixture to 
the atmosphere. 
2. Continuous release of the complete inventory of vapour mixture 
to the atmosphere in 10 minutes. 
3. Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 
mm.  
 
 
            
 
           
 
           
 
Separator 
vessel 
4. Instantaneous loss of the complete inventory of vapour mixture to 
the atmosphere. 
5. Continuous release of the complete inventory of vapour mixture 
to the atmosphere in 10 minutes. 
6. Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 
mm. 
           
 
           
 
           
 
 
 
Absorption 
column 
 
7. Instantaneous loss of the complete inventory of gasoline to the 
atmosphere. 
8. Continuous release of the complete inventory of gasoline in 10 
minutes. 
9. Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 
mm.  
 
           
 
           
 
           
 
 
Gasoline pump 
 
10. Catastrophic failure, continuous release of gasoline through the 
largest connecting pipe (6 inches). 
11. Leakage from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 % of the 
largest connecting pipe. 
 
           
 
           
 
 
 
Heat exchanger 
 
12. Instantaneous release of the complete inventory of gasoline to the 
atmosphere. 
13. Continuous release of the complete inventory of gasoline to the 
atmosphere in 10 minutes. 
14. Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 
mm.    
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5.2.2 Pipe bridge 
As stated above, whenever there are pipelines with lengths over 10 meters, the risk of rupture 
and leak should be included in analysis as separate accident scenarios. For each of the three 
pipes, both leak and rupture scenarios will be analysed. The accident frequency for the 
pipeline containing natural gas is set according to the RIVM (2009) guideline, while the 
frequencies for the pipelines containing LNG are calculated depending on the operating 
hours. The scenarios originating in the LNG pipelines are analysed in the means of one 
accident scenario during circulation of LNG in the pipes and one scenario during loading of a 
ship. The operating pressure of the pipes containing LNG is 3 bars during circulation and 6.7 
bars during loading, while the gas pipeline operates near atmospheric pressure. Based on the 
information gained from an existing QRA, performed by Lloyd´s Register Consulting, it was 
concluded that LNG is circulated in the pipelines for approximately 8760 operating hours per 
year, while unloading is approximated to be carried out for 481 hours per year. The pipelines 
are equipped with emergency shutdown (ESD) systems and the calculations are conducted 
with both functioning and malfunctioning systems. The reliability of the emergency shutdown 
system is deemed as 97 %, with regard to the RIVM (2009) guidelines. The accident 
frequencies are estimated according to the guidelines in RIVM (2009), making use of the 
operating hours and the reliability of the emergency shutdown system. The different accident 
scenarios, which are further analysed, and their estimated frequencies are presented in table 
15. 
 
Table  15. Frequency of pipeline accidents.  
Scenario Frequency [y
-1
m
-1
] 
 
 
 Pipe 1 (300 mm) Pipe 2 (50 mm) Pipe 3 (300 mm) 
 
Circulation scenario 
- Rupture in the pipeline 
(functioning ESD) 
- Rupture in the pipeline 
(malfunctioning ESD) 
- 10 % leak (functioning ESD) 
- 10 % leak (malfunctioning ESD) 
 
Unloading scenario 
- Rupture in the pipeline 
(functioning ESD) 
- Rupture in the pipeline 
(malfunctioning ESD) 
- 10 % leak (functioning ESD) 
- 10 % leak (malfunctioning ESD) 
 
 
           
 
          
 
          
          
 
 
          
 
          
 
          
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gas pipe scenario 
- Rupture in the pipeline 
(functioning ESD) 
- Rupture in the pipeline 
(malfunctioning ESD) 
- 10 % leak (functioning ESD) 
- 10 % leak (malfunctioning ESD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
          
 
          
          
 
  
47 
 
5.3 Analysis of the identified hazards 
All accident scenarios are simulated in DNVs commercial software package, Phast Risk 
version 6.7. The program uses conventional consequence models and enables multiple 
accident scenarios to be analysed simultaneously. The program enables the overall risk profile 
to be computed in form of individual risk contours and FN-curves in a GIS-based 
environment. For detailed information concerning the Phast Risk software, the reader is 
referred to DNVs homepage. For every loss of containment scenario, the program simulates 
the consequence and frequency of every possible outcome with regard to delayed or 
immediate ignition for different wind speeds and directions. In all simulations, stationary 
material reactivity is used for the calculation of immediate ignition. In line with the suggested 
simulation parameters described in RIVM (2009), a constant delayed ignition probability of 
0.5 is assumed for all calculations and in areas where explosion can occur under turbulent 
conditions, the multi-energy curve number is set as 8.  
 
Further, the consequence and frequency analysis is divided into three parts. First, it is of 
interest to analyse the risk of domino effects within the VRU, this to enable additional 
accident scenarios to be identified and included in further analysis. Secondly, the risk of 
propagation from the VRU to other parts of the system is analysed. Finally, it is of interest to 
analyse the risk of damage to the VRU with regard to accident scenarios in the pipe bridge. 
Each part is analysed with the approach described in the developed method, without 
delimiting the analysis to any specific level of escalation. In order to evaluate the impact of 
taking domino effects into consideration, the risk of propagation to other parts of the system is 
both analysed with and without the inclusion of domino scenarios. To relate back to the 
developed method, described in the flowchart in figure 8 in section 4.1, the first step of 
analysing the chain of accident is to estimate the heat and overpressure loads following an 
accident at the given distances of which target equipment is located. If escalation is possible, 
the probability of damage is estimated with the aid of vulnerability models. The consequence 
that may follows target equipments being exposed to external loads is estimated by comparing 
the heat and overpressure loads to given threshold values for different damage state categories 
and loss intensity classes. This classification and relevant statistical data of previous accidents 
are used as input and enables secondary accident scenarios to be determined and further levels 
of escalation to be analysed.  
 
5.3.1 Domino effects within the VRU 
As a starting point, damage probabilities for different levels of radiation intensity and 
overpressure values for pressurised vessels with various sizes were defined. This was done 
with aid of the defined escalation threshold values and the vulnerability model for pressurised 
process equipments, described in section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. Next, the consequences following 
all of the representative loss of containment scenarios were simulated. To enable an early 
overview of where domino effects most likely are to present themselves and which equipment 
that is of concern, a risk contour with regard to property damage for pressurised vessels was 
computed. The volume of interest was set to 125 m
3
, this with regard to the volumes of the 
adsorber vessels. The frequency of interest was chosen to            and as figure 14 
shows, propagation within the area including the heat exchanger, separator vessel and 
absorption column, can be expected to occur with a frequency of           .  
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Figure 14. Risk contour with regard to property damage for pressurised vessels with a volume of 125 m
3
.  
        
As figure 14 evidence, pressurised vessels with a volume of 125 m
3
 can be estimated to suffer 
damage with a frequency of            due to exposure of external loads. By comparing the 
estimated frequency of              in which the separator vessel and the absorption column 
may be inflicted by damage to the generic frequencies for loss of containment scenarios 
presented in table 14, it is not hard to grasp the substantial risk contribution if including 
domino effects in the analysis. Thus cannot the risk of domino effects occurring between the 
different parts of the VRU be disregarded as the chain of accident is likely to have great 
impact on the overall risk profile. Readers should note that the risk contour presented in figure 
14, is without any regard to the risk of units being fully engulfed by fire. This because the 
Phast Risk software is limited to calculating the maximum heat flux at the border of the pool, 
thus neglecting the fact that target units situated within the borders of the pool are being 
exposed to considerably higher heat fluxes. Therefore, the risk of units being damaged due to 
exposure of external heat loads may in fact be higher than the risk contour in figure 14. Thus 
the heat load for scenarios of units being fully engulfed in fires must be dealt with in an 
alternative way, as shown later in this chapter.  
 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that a more detailed analysis of the potential chain of 
accidents that may follow each representative scenario is needed to enable a more realistic 
risk profile to be computed. Before starting such analysis, a relative domino risk ranking 
including all units within the VRU is defined. 
 
5.3.1.1 Defining a relative domino risk ranking  
To avoid ending up in a circular reference, scenarios are only allowed to propagate to units 
that pose a greater threat to the surrounding area than the initial accident scenario. This means 
that the overall consequences following propagation need to be increased compared to the 
consequence of the initial accident scenario. In cases where multiple units can be exposed to 
external loads simultaneously it is important that all potential chain of events that may follow 
the primary accident are analysed, starting from the unit having the greatest escalation 
potential and then working down the ladder to units with lower domino risk ranking. 
Otherwise the risk may be overestimated.  
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In line with the proposed method, such ranking should be based on investigating which unit 
that have the largest amount of flammable substance, the flammability level and ignition 
point, and in what form it is being processed (gas or liquid, pressurised or atmospheric 
conditions).  
 
Due to the fact that the adsorber vessel has the greatest explosion potential and as described in 
the hazard identification, is vulnerable for external exposure, damage on this unit is deemed 
as the final worst credible event. Comparing the amount of substance that may follow a loss 
of containment in the heat exchanger or due to pump failure, the consequences concerning 
these accident scenarios can be seen as equal in severity. Based on that and due to the fact that 
the equipments are positioned at the same relative distances from the separator vessel, 
absorption column and the adsorber vessel these units are deemed as equally likely to cause 
propagation to either one of these objects. Escalation between the gasoline pump and the heat 
exchanger is thus neglected from the analysis. Looking at the adsorption column and the 
separator vessel, these units are positioned at the same relative distance from the adsorber 
vessel. However, the secondary event that may follow a loss of containment in the column is 
likely to be a pool fire and due to the short distance to the adsorber vessels the risk of this unit 
being exposed to heat loads that can damage the vessel. The separator vessel can cause an 
explosion if exposed to external loads, however due to the fact that the vessel is equipped 
with safety valves and that the gas is handled near atmospheric pressure the risk of explosion 
is considered low. The more likely secondary scenario is therefore a jet fire that is being 
vented through the safety valve or a fireball that emerges when the vessel bursts. Therefore, a 
loss of containment in the absorption column is ranked as having greater domino risk 
potential than a loss of containment in the separator vessel.   
 
From the reasoning above, the probability of damage to target equipment should be estimated 
from the starting point that damage to the adsorber vessel is analysed first, followed by the 
absorption column and lastly the separator vessel, as shown in figure 15. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 15. The process in which the frequency analysis of chain of events is based upon within the 
VRU.  
Absorption column Separator vessel 
No             
No            
LOC gasoline pump/ heat 
exchanger 
Adsorber vessel 
Yes        
No           
Yes         
Yes         
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5.3.1.2 Detailed analysis of the chain of events  
To give the reader understanding of how the method is applied when analysing the chain of 
accidents, a more detailed description of the chain of events following accident scenarios 
originating in the heat exchanger (scenario 12, 13 and 14) is presented.  
 
After having stated how the different equipments are ranked relative to each other, it is a 
straightforward approach to analyse the chain of accidents following the different 
representative accidents scenarios. First, it is of interest to identify all possible 
outcomes/escalation vectors following the loss of containment scenarios. The possible 
outcomes following flammable liquids being released to the atmosphere are presented in 
figure 16.   
 
 
 
 
The next step is to analyse if any of the outcomes can exceed the escalation threshold values 
for pressurised equipments defined in section 5.1.3. Simulations in the Phast Risk software 
show that for the three losses of containment scenarios, the only outcome that exceeds the 
escalation threshold values and thus can lead to a domino effect is a pool fire. For scenario 12, 
the risk of a vapour cloud explosion is also present. However, the frequency of overpressure 
exceeding escalation threshold values is approximately            , which is lower than the 
cut off criteria            and thus this effect is neglected from the analysis. By analysing 
the different pool fire scenarios in detail, the radiation intensity to target equipments can be 
estimated. In the case where the radius of the pool fire exceeds the distance to target 
equipment, the unit is assumed to be engulfed by fire and the heat load to target equipment is 
approximated to 160 kW/m
2
. This calculated with a maximum flame surface emissivity of 
140 kW/m
2 
and a convective heat transfer of 20 kW/m
2
. The probability of domino effect,   , 
is then calculated by converting the probit value, Y, into a value of probability, which have 
been estimated by using the vulnerability model for pressurised equipments described in 
section 4.2.2  with regard to each target vessels volume. The probability of damage is 
estimated by using equation 5, which is a simplified correlation with a fitting error of        
in comparison to the numerical approach, why it is deemed as suitable for this purpose.   
 
   
     
   
  
       
     
 
          (Eq.5) 
 
  
Figure 16. Outcomes of flammable liquid being released to the atmosphere (RIVM, 2009).  
Explosion (+ late pool fire)  
Gasoline  
Direct ignition 
Delayed ignition 
Pool fire 
Flash fire (+ late pool fire) 
No consequences 
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For each of the three scenarios, the heat load at the position of target equipments where 
converted to a probability of damage,   . A summary of the results gained from the analysis 
is presented in table 16. 
 
Table  16. Results from the analysis of first level of escalation for scenario 12, 13 and 14.  
Accident 
scenario 
Outcome Target equipment Heat load  
[kW/m
2
] 
   
12 Pool fire  
          
                
Absorption column (22 m
3
)  
Separator vessel (19 m
3
)   
Adsorber vessel (125 m
3
) 
160 (Engulfed) 
160 (Engulfed) 
30  
0,95 
0.95 
0 
 
13 Pool fire 
          
                
Absorption column (22 m
3
) 
Separator vessel (19 m
3
)   
Adsorber vessel (125 m
3
) 
160 (Engulfed) 
160 (Engulfed) 
30 
 
0,95 
0.95 
0 
 
14 Pool fire 
          
                
Absorption column (22 m
3
)  
Separator vessel (19 m
3
)   
Adsorber vessel (125 m
3
) 
45 
45 
0 
0.15 
0.16 
0 
 
When analysing the chain of events that can lead to the final worst credible scenario, it is 
important to first analyse the probability of direct propagation to this scenario. If this is 
deemed possible, escalation to other units is only allowed according to the approach described 
in figure 15, otherwise the overall risk may be overestimated. The damage target equipments 
may suffer due to exposure of heat load are estimated by comparing the amount of heat load 
at the position of target equipments to the escalation threshold values for the damage state and 
the loss intensity classes, defined in section 5.1.3. From reasoning with regard to these 
classifications, statistical data of previous accidents, see table 4 in section 4.2.1, and the 
physical aspects concerning escalation vectors, the secondary accident scenario is estimated.    
Because of the absorption column and the separator vessel being engulfed in fire in scenario 
12 and 13, the damage state and the loss intensity following these scenarios are deemed as 
DS2LI3. The expected secondary scenarios are therefore assumed to be a complete loss of 
inventory within 1 minute that gives rise to an additional pool fire and a fireball, respectively. 
In both of the pool fire scenarios the bund limits the spread of the additional pools, limiting 
the heat load on the adsorber vessel. By comparing the amount of heat load that the 
absorption column and the separator vessel are exposed to with the escalation threshold for 
scenario 14, these vessels can be assumed to suffer minor damage, DS1LI1, giving rise to an 
additional small pool fire and a small jet fire, respectively. 
 
When analysing further levels of escalation, all secondary accident scenarios are simulated in 
the Phast Risk software program, providing sequential effect zones, which enable third level 
of escalation to be analysed accordingly to the above described approach. To illustrate how 
the amount of heat load to target equipment is estimated, the radiation intensity following the 
additional small pool fire scenario, initiated by the absorption column suffering damage in 
scenario 14, is presented in figure 17.   
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Figure 17. Heat radiation levels following a small leak scenario in the absorption column, red = 100 kW/m
2
, 
yellow = 30 kW/m
2 
and blue = 15 kW/m
2
. 
 
As shown in figure 17, the adsorber vessel is likely to be exposed of a heat load of 30 kW/m
2
 
when a small leak scenario in the absorption column occurs. The result for scenarios leading 
to a catastrophic rupture of the absorption column shows that the additional pool fire will 
spread to the existing bund, exposing the adsorber vessel to a radiation intensity of 45 kW/m
2
. 
These results show that the radiation intensity for a small leak in the absorption column not 
will reach the set escalation threshold value for pressurised vessels (40 kW/m
2
), while a 
catastrophic rupture of the adsorption column leads to a pool fire that exceeds this threshold 
and therefore can cause damage on the adsorber vessel. As for the fireball and the jet fire 
scenarios that may occur if the separator vessel is exposed to external heat loads, the 
consequences in these scenarios are lower than the set escalation threshold for a pressurised 
vessel. Thus, damage on the adsorber vessel is only possible when the absorption column 
suffers a catastrophic rupture. The probabilities of the final outcomes are calculated by event 
tree analysis, as shown in figure 18, 19 and 20.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
1 
0    Adsorber vessel 
12 
0.95 
0.05 
0.03 
0.97 
0.95 
0.05 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0.0025     No escalation  
0.9215     Absorption column  
0     Adsorber vessel  
0     Absorption column  
 
0.0475     Separator vessel 
0.0285     Adsorber vessel 
Figure 18. Event tree analysis of scenario 12.  
53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The frequency for every final outcome is calculated with equation 3 and 4.    
 
                      (Eq. 3) 
 
                   (Eq. 4) 
 
Where     is the expected frequency of domino effect,     is the expected frequency of the 
primary event and    is the escalation ( ) probability given that the primary event (  ) 
occurs.  
 
For each of the primary accident scenarios defined in table 14, the chain of accidents is 
analysed with the above described procedure shown for scenario 12, 13 and 14. Further, only 
the results gained from the analysis of the other accident scenarios (4-11) are presented. Note 
that accidents originating from the adsorber vessel do not contribute to any domino effect 
within the VRU as this unit is defined to have the most severe consequences. A summary of 
the frequencies for all final outcomes is presented in table 17. 
  
0 
1 
0    Adsorber vessel 
14 
0.15 
0.85 
0 
1 
0.16 
0.84 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0.714       No escalation  
0.150     Absorption column  
0     Adsorber vessel  
0     Absorption column  
 
0.136     Separator vessel  
0     Adsorber vessel 
0 
1 
0    Adsorber vessel 
13 
0.95 
0.05 
0.03 
0.97 
0.95 
0.05 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0.0025     No escalation  
0.9215     Absorption column  
0     Adsorber vessel  
0     Absorption column  
 
0.0475     Separator vessel  
0.0285     Adsorber vessel 
Figure 19. Event tree analysis of scenario 13. 
Figure 20. Event tree analysis of scenario 14. 
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Table  17. Results from the analysis of chain of events within the VRU. 
Accident scenario Final outcome Damage state and loss 
intensity class 
Frequency [y
-1
] 
4- Separator vessel Adsorber vessel  
Absorption column  
DS2LI3 
DS2LI3 
      
   
      
   
 
5- Separator vessel 
 
Adsorber vessel  
Absorption column 
 
DS2LI3 
DS2LI3 
 
      
   
      
   
 
6- Separator vessel 
 
No escalation 
 
- 
 
- 
 
7- Absorption column 
 
Adsorber vessel  
 
DS1LI1 
 
         
 
8- Absorption column 
 
Adsorber vessel 
 
DS1LI1 
 
         
 
9- Absorption column 
 
No escalation 
 
- 
 
- 
 
10- Gasoline pump 
 
Adsorber vessel 
Absorption column 
Separator vessel 
 
DS1LI1 
DS2LI3 
DS2LI3 
 
         
         
         
 
11- Gasoline pump 
 
Adsorber vessel 
Absorption column 
Separator vessel 
 
DS1LI1 
DS2LI3 
DS2LI3 
 
         
         
         
 
12- Heat exchanger 
 
Adsorber vessel 
Absorption column 
Separator vessel 
 
DS1LI1 
DS2LI3 
DS2LI3 
 
         
         
         
 
13- Heat exchanger 
 
Adsorber vessel 
Absorption column 
Separator vessel 
 
DS1LI1 
DS2LI3 
DS2LI3 
 
         
         
         
 
14- Heat exchanger 
 
Absorption column 
Separator vessel 
 
DS1LI1 
DS1LI1 
 
         
         
 
By summarising each of the final outcomes, the annual frequency of accident scenarios that 
originate from exposure of external loads can be computed. Looking at the results presented 
in table 17, there is a substantial risk of the absorption column and the separator vessel taking 
damage from accident scenarios originated in the heat exchanger and the gasoline pump. It is 
mainly the pool fire scenarios that give rise to initiating a chain of events, however the 
consequences of these kind of scenarios are limited by the existing bund that are present in the 
VRU. This safety installation has been incorporated in the Phast Risk software program 
during simulations, showing that it protects the adsorber vessels from being fully engulfed in 
fire and limit the exposure of heat radiation from distance source, thus lowering the risk of 
potential explosion scenarios occurring. However, as seen in the result, there is a small risk of 
the adsorber vessel taking damage when exposed to distance radiation. Although the damage 
state and the loss intensity class is DS1LI1, meaning that the vessel is likely to suffer minor 
damage, the risk of a confined explosion is still present. This due to the fact that the vessel 
contains a combustible mixture of air and butane gas during a large part of the process and 
that the temperature rise in the steel can ignite this mixture before the vessel suffers damage.  
Readers should note that the existing runoff drain situated between the absorption column and 
the adsorber vessel, most likely is able to hinder the gasoline released from ever reaching the 
bund border. However, as no calculations regarding the capacity of the runoff drain have been 
included in the analysis the runoff drain cannot be guaranteed to manage these kinds of leak 
scenarios, thus has this safety measure been left out from the simulations. When analysing the 
risk of domino effects to other subsystems, the scenario of a confined explosion in the 
adsorber vessel is thus included. 
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5.3.2 The risk of domino effect to other parts of the system 
From the results gained in the analysis of escalation potential within the VRU, the additional 
domino scenarios from analysing the chain of events (see table 17) can be incorporated in the 
analysis of domino effects to other subsystems. This enables a more realistic presentation of 
the risk profile within the VRU. By simulating the initial accident scenarios and the final 
outcomes for each chain of events identified in the VRU, the overall risk of propagation to 
other subsystems can be analysed. By implementing vulnerability models for damage on 
equipment in the Phast Risk software, individual risk contours showing the annual frequency 
of damage to different equipment categories can be computed. As damage on the pipe bridge 
is of interest to analyse, threshold values and vulnerability models for overpressure and heat 
radiation have been selected for elongated respectively smaller pressurised equipments in the 
simulations. The results from the simulations are presented in figure 21 and as shown, damage 
on the pipe bridge can be expected with a frequency approximately of           .  
 
 
 
Figure 21. The risk that the pipe bridge suffers damage due to exposure of heat and overpressure loads from the 
representative accident scenarios with regard to escalation within the VRU.  
 
To see how much the accident scenarios due to domino effects within the VRU contribute to 
the overall risk, a simulation without these scenarios has also been conducted. The results 
from this simulation are presented in figure 22. 
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Figure 22. The risk that the pipe bridge suffers damage due to exposure of heat and overpressure loads from the 
representative accident scenarios without regard to escalation within the VRU. 
 
Comparing the two results, the main contribution to the risk is found at the            and the 
           contours. The annual frequency in which the LNG pipeline is estimated to suffer 
damage can be approximated to        when including domino scenarios, which can be 
compared to        if not including such scenarios. The increased risk is mainly due to the 
additional overpressure effects from the confined explosion scenario in the adsorber vessel. 
To enable a more detailed comparison of the risk with and without the inclusion of domino 
effects, risk ranking points were implemented in the simulations. These risk ranking points 
enables a detailed point estimation of the risk of property damage for the equipment category 
of interest, such risk ranking point were defined in the middle of the LNG pipeline situated 
closest to the VRU. This point estimation shows that the risk of LNG pipelines suffering 
damage is approximately               taking into account the risk of domino effects and 
approximately              without the inclusion of accident scenarios originating from 
domino effects. These results evidence that domino effects can have a significant impact on 
the overall risk profile and thus these kinds of aspects should not be neglected from a QRA. 
Otherwise, the risk may be underestimated.  
 
5.3.3 The risk of external domino effects impacting the VRU 
As stated in the risk identification, there is a risk that accidents in the LNG pipelines may 
propagate and damage units within the VRU. By simulating all leak and rupture scenarios 
with regard to property damage for pressurised vessels with a volume of approximately  
150 m
3
, representative risk contours for damage on units within the VRU can be computed. In 
simulations, the location of accident scenarios is set in intervals of maximum 25 meters 
between two scenarios. The vulnerability model is set for pressurised vessels 150 m
3
 for the 
purpose of investigating the frequency in which the adsorber vessel is likely to take damage. 
The results from these simulations are shown in figure 23.  
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Figure 23. The risk associated to accident scenarios in the LNG pipelines. 
 
As shown, units within the VRU are likely to take damage if leak or rupture scenario occurs 
in the LNG pipelines. However, the consequences from accident scenarios in the pipelines are 
far worse than those originating in the VRU, thus propagation to any of the units in the VRU 
is not of interest for further analysis. This because no secondary accident scenarios in the 
VRU can escalate the consequences. Readers should note that the risk profile is computed 
without regard to any cooling effects that the liquefied LNG gas may have on target 
equipments.  
 
5.4 Conclusion of the results  
As shown in the risk contours in figure 21, the risk of accidents originating from the VRU 
propagating to the LNG pipelines is low, approximately           . Thus, with the safety 
measures installed, the safety distances from the units in the VRU to other parts of the system 
are deemed to be sufficient. Mostly, it is potential explosion scenarios in the adsorber vessels 
that can cause propagation to the pipelines, thus it is assuring that these vessels are separated 
from the rest of the units within the VRU system, protecting them from external loads. 
Looking at the chain of events that can lead to an explosion scenario in the adsorber vessel, 
they all involve the absorption column taking severe damage. As seen in the event tree 
analysis presented in figure 18 and 19 the probability of the column taking severe damage is 
associated to the vessel being fully engulfed in pool fires. This indicates that pool fires have 
great escalation potential if short distances between units are present and the installation lacks 
separating bunds. Thus, it is important to ensure that no units with great escalation potential 
(e.g. large pressurised vessels containing liquefied gas) are allowed to be fully engulfed by 
fire to avoid severe accident scenarios like BLEVEs.   
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6. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD  
The objective of the study has been to develop a comprehensive method for performing 
quantitative risk analysis with respect to property damage and domino effects in a process 
plant. The method should guide and clearly define how domino scenarios can be incorporated 
in a QRA framework. To ensure the functionality of the method, criterions for what the 
method should be able to deal have been defined: 
 
 The method should be applicable to well established analysis techniques and not 
dependent on complex algorithms for the analysis of the chain of events.   
 
 The method should enable a risk profile for property damage to be computed with 
regard to all accident scenarios, including potential domino scenarios.  
 
 The method should enable the risk of property damage with respect to domino effects 
to be analysed, both within a subsystem and between different subsystems.  
 
 The method should enable site specific safety distances either to be established or 
validated with regard to property damage and domino effects.   
 
From the baseline that all potential leak scenarios were defined as representative scenarios 
and included in the analysis from the beginning, it was a straightforward process to analyse 
the different chain of events following the proposed methodology. Looking at the process in 
which the risk of domino effects has been analysed in the case study, the chain of events has 
successfully been analysed with the aid of event tree analysis, which is deemed as a well 
established analysis technique. As shown during the case study, the method allows the 
consequence and frequency of each final outcome, identified during the analysis of the chain 
of events, to be estimated, which allow each final outcome to be seen as a separate scenario. 
This enables the additional domino scenarios to be dealt with in the same way as the initial 
accident scenarios and thus can risk contours with regard to all accident scenarios be 
computed. As shown in the case study both domino effects within a subsystem and domino 
effects between subsystems have been effectively analysed. It also indicates that the method is 
flexible and can be adapted for different kinds of domino risk analysis, depending on the 
scope and the level of detail that is of concern. As shown in the case study, the overall risk 
computation of property damage with regard to domino effects enables existing safety 
distances between different subsystems to be validated. With the above reasoning, the 
proposed method is considered to be well applicable in practise, as all defined criterions were 
fulfilled during the case study.  
 
However, some pitfalls were encountered during the case study, which can hinder an effective 
analysis of domino risks if not dealt with in a proper manor. In the next section, the pitfalls 
and the procedures to avoid them are further elaborated on. 
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6.1 Problematic aspects concerning domino effects 
As stated in chapter 4, it is important to start the analysis by defining a relative domino risk 
ranking to avoid ending up in a circular reference. As the case study shows, this is a critical 
aspect when analysing the chain of events for units situated close to each other. However, 
defining such ranking is not a simple task as many parameters should be taken into account in 
the decision making. The risk ranking should at least take into account which flammable 
substances that are present, the amount, the likelihood, the relative position to target 
equipments, which safety measures that are present and how these affect different accident 
scenarios. For example, a unit containing gasoline may have a great escalation potential if 
there is no delimiting bund protecting target equipment from being fully engulfed in fire, but 
if a bund is present the same unit may not even pose an escalation threat.  
 
In the case study, secondary accidents have been determined on the basis of the proposed 
damage state and loss of containment classes for different external load intensities and 
statistical data of previous accidents. However, there are several factors except for the given 
load intensity that decide what the final outcome will be and the severity of the consequences. 
Take a pressurised vessel exposed to distant radiation for example, the pressure rise in the 
vessel is dependent on the radiation intensity which in turn decides when the pressure relief 
valve opens. Depending on the thickness of the vessel shell, the time lapse between the 
opening of the pressure relief valve and the time to failure may vary a lot. This time span 
decides the amount of substance remaining when the vessel bursts, which can participate in a 
secondary accident scenario. The amount of substance available with regard to the internal 
pressure and temperature as well as the mix of fuel and air affects the characteristics of the 
final outcome. All these variables make it difficult to unambiguously define the final outcome 
of units exposed to external heat loads and by involving a lot of uncertainties in the analysis 
the results can be questionable. 
 
Another problematic part of the analysis is to consider synergetic effects, which has been 
delimited from the proposed method. Depending on the level of detail chosen for the analysis 
the influence of these effects will vary. When including multiple levels of escalation, these 
effects are more likely to present themselves as the level of detail increases and therefore also 
the risk of several units taking damage at the same time. The increased number of accident 
scenarios will in turn heighten the risk of a unit being exposed to external loads from different 
sources at the same time. By delimiting the analysis to only include first level of escalation, 
the influence of synergetic effects will therefore decrease. 
 
It is believed to be a difficult task to get plant managers to pay extra in order to get a 
quantitative analysis of the risk of domino effects instead of a qualitative analysis when it is 
not required by the legislation. When developing the method focus has been on making use of 
simplified tools to keep the analysis within a manageable timeframe, thus limiting the extra 
cost associated with the inclusion of domino effects in a QRA. As seen in the case study, 
when integrating escalation effects the time needed for the analysis increases compared to a 
conventional QRA. However, the additional domino scenarios initiated by equipments being 
exposed to external loads have been analysed within a reasonable timeframe, showing the 
effectiveness of the proposed method. If the same approach with equal level of detail was to 
be adopted when analysing a whole plant it is however not certain that this would be the case. 
It is deemed more likely that the time needed for analysis would increase beyond the 
timeframe associated with a QRA, making such analysis unmanageable in practise. Therefore, 
before drawing any conclusion of this concern, the method needs to be applied and evaluated 
for analysis of a large system. If the method would have been applied for a larger part of a 
system or a whole plant, not only would it be uncertain if the analysis would be manageable 
within the timeframe associated with a QRA,  it would also be difficult to define which risk 
sources that have the greatest escalation potential.  
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This as a large amount of units most certainly would have the potential to initiate a chain of 
accident in such system. When analysing larger systems, it would be beneficial to have a 
holistic view of the overall risk of property damage. This can be achieved by computing risk 
contours for all initial accident scenarios with regard to property damage, such approach 
would enable critical areas with regard to the risk of domino effects to be identified in an 
early part of the analysis. If having a predefined criterion, stating which annual frequency 
domino effects can be seen as acceptable, the critical areas not fulfilling the criterion can be 
identified and further analysed in detail to identify the scenarios with the largest contribution 
to the overall risk. By delimiting the analysis to critical areas, the complexity and the 
workload is deemed as more likely to be held within reasonable proportions. 
 
Many of the problematic areas concerning the analysis of property damage and domino 
effects can be dealt with if delimiting the analysis of property damage to only include first 
levels of escalation. Not only would the method be more applicable to larger systems, the risk 
of ending up in a circular reference and the uncertainties associated with the estimation of the 
secondary accidents would also decrease. The influence of synergetic effects and the time 
needed for analysis also decreases due to this delimitation. If narrowing the analysis to only 
deal with first level of escalation it is important to define a conservative acceptance criterion 
that takes into consideration that damage on equipment in reality may lead to further levels of 
escalation. As seen in the case study, it is the initial high frequency accident scenarios that 
have the potential to fully engulf target equipments that are the largest contribution sources in 
changing the overall risk profile when including domino scenarios in the analysis. Taking that 
fact into account, if delimiting the analysis to only consider first level of escalation it seems 
reasonable to state that the results gained from such approach only should be seen as reliable 
if the risk of target equipments being fully engulfed by fire can be seen as negligible. As 
bunds and runoff drains to a high extent are present within process industries, such conditions 
are likely to be found. However, before neglecting the risk of target equipments being fully 
engulfed by fire the functionality and the capacity of such installations should be validated.       
 
6.2 Tools used in the method 
The proposed method is to a great extent dependent of the use of vulnerability models for 
overpressure and heat radiation effects. These models are simplified correlations based on 
statistical analysis, experimental data and finite element analysis. Although these correlations 
are simplified and may not represent a realistic estimation of equipments taking damage from 
external loads, these models are still deemed as the best available tools for quantifying the 
risk of property damage within the timeframe of a QRA. Looking beyond the fact that these 
models may be seen as over conservative, as no regard to safety installations has been taken 
into account when developing the models, they show great advantages when computing the 
overall risk profile. Due to the simplicity of these models they may be integrated into existing 
computer programs, as shown in the case study where the Phast Risk software package was 
used. This ability allows risk contours for the overall risk of property damage for different 
equipment categories to easily be computed, which in turn serves as useful support for 
decision making.  
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With regard to the limited time associated with QRAs, the quantitative analysis of domino 
effects requires the aid of computer codes for the consequence and frequency estimation. This 
as the integration of domino effect leads to a more complex analysis. Software packages like 
the Phast Risk program are beneficial to use, as these kinds of packages enable the 
consequences and the frequencies of multiple accident scenarios to be calculated 
simultaneously. If not having such tools available, the proposed method most certainly would 
be difficult to perform within a reasonable timeframe. However, when using computational 
programs in the analysis it is up to the user to be aware of the limitations of the program. For 
example Phast Risk cannot calculate the heat load within the flame and this effect must 
therefore be treated separately outside the program, otherwise the risk may be under 
estimated. During the case study the use of Phast Risk lead to inter linkages of some of the 
boxes in the flowchart, indicating that the method is not dependent on every step being 
performed separately.  
 
The vulnerability models used for the calculations of damage probability on target equipments 
have been correlated to take into account the time needed before mitigating actions can be 
taken. However, in the case where tertiary or higher levels of escalation is possible it could be 
argued that the elapsed time causing first level of escalation should be seen as a preparation 
time for additional mitigating actions. For example, if a unit is exposed to distance radiation 
causing that unit to rupture after an exposure time of 8 minutes, which in turn leads to an 
additional pool fire exposing a secondary unit, it can be argued that the rescue service has a 
shorter response time for dealing with the consequences of the additional pool fire scenario. 
When estimating the probability of damage on the third unit, the elapsed time of 8 minutes 
causing the secondary unit to suffer damage may be included and seen as preparation time for 
mitigation actions to be taken on the third unit. Meaning, the probability of mitigation actions 
increases with the level of escalation as the elapsed time of previous accidents should be 
included as preparation time. How such aspects should be dealt with in analysis is undefined, 
which serves as another argument for the analysis of domino effects being delimited to only 
include first levels of escalation. This to keep the uncertainties to a minimum, making the 
results of the analysis more reliable.   
 
6.3 Pros and cons associated with the method 
In comparison to the qualitative approach, which to this day is the most adopted way of 
analysing domino effects, there are several benefits with the proposed method.  As it enables 
a quantitative analysis of the risk of property damage with regard to domino effects the 
subjectivity which the qualitative approach is linked with is substantially decreased, making 
the results more reliable. During the case study it has been showed that the inclusion of 
domino effects may have a substantial impact on the overall risk profile, and that the 
computation of risk contours with regard to property damage is a good way of revealing such 
effects. By computing such risk contours, risk based decisions of whether the risk of domino 
effects is acceptable or not can with more confidence be made compared to a qualitative 
assessment of such effects. The method can also be used in order to estimate site specific 
safety distances and to make cost effective layouts with regard to the risk of property damage, 
which in comparison to more generalised safety distances can prove to be economically 
favourable for the plant owner. 
 
One negative aspect concerning the incorporation of domino effects in the QRA is that the 
degree of uncertainties increases in the analysis. If not clearly expressing which uncertainties 
that the analysis is based on and how they have been dealt with throughout the process, the 
results of the analysis should be questioned. Therefore, it is crucial that the risk agent whom is 
performing the QRA have proper knowledge and understanding of the underlying theory of 
the tools used in the analysis.   
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6.4 Further research needed 
Something that has been disregarded in this study is how the risk profile with regard to 
property damage gained from the QRA should be assessed to determine whether the risk is 
acceptable or not. One approach would be to incorporate the results from the QRA in a cost 
benefit analysis, taking into account the cost for replacing damaged units, abruption costs and 
other potential losses in the supply chain. However, such analysis is time consuming and it 
may be hard to convince stakeholders to pay the extra cost associated with such analysis. 
Another approach, which is deemed as the most useable, is to define an acceptance criterion 
based on the annual frequency. A comparison can be drawn to the oil and gas industry where 
an acceptance criterion of            for damage on critical structures has been defined. If 
such criterion where to be established and accepted amongst stakeholders, it would enable an 
easy assessment of whether the risk contours with regard to property damage gained from the 
QRA can be seen as acceptable or not. For such criterion to be defined, research involving 
different stakeholders needs to be conducted.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective with this thesis has been to develop a comprehensive method for performing 
quantitative risk analysis with respect to property damage and domino effects in a process 
plant. In order to achieve the objective and to ensure the applicability of the method, criteria 
for what the method should enable were defined. The drawn conclusions are based on how 
well these criteria´s were fulfilled and the results from the case study.  
 
During the case study, the method has proven to enable the risk of property damage with 
regard to domino effects to be quantitatively analysed. The results from the case study, 
evidence the importance of taking domino effects into consideration in QRAs, as the risk may 
be underestimated if not. During the evaluation of the method, it has been concluded that the 
chain of accidents should be delimited to only include first level of escalation. Such 
delimitation minimises the uncertainties linked to domino effects, thus making the results 
more reliable. It also enables the method to be more applicable when analysing larger 
systems, as the complexity and workload decreases. It has been concluded that computing risk 
contours with regard to property damage for all initial accident scenarios enables critical 
areas, where domino effects are likely to present themselves, to be identified in an early stage 
of the analysis. During the thesis, the need for a well established acceptance criterion with 
regard to property damage has been evidenced. To relate back to the criteria´s for what the 
method should enable and whether these have been fulfilled or not, this is further elaborated 
on:  
 
 The method should be applicable to well established analysis techniques and not 
dependent on complex algorithms for the analysis of the chain of events.   
 
As shown during the case study, the chain of events were analysed with the aid of event tree 
analysis, which is deemed as a well established method and well known amongst 
practitioners. It should be stated that the Phast Risk software served as a great support, as it 
enables multiple accident scenarios to be analysed simultaneously and the overall risk profile 
to be computed. Without any aid of computational resources, it would be difficult to perform 
such analysis.      
 
 The method should enable a risk profile for property damage to be computed with 
regard to all accident scenarios, including potential domino scenarios.  
 
The case study shows that the risk contours with regard to property damage enables a holistic 
view of the overall risk profile, including identified domino scenarios.   
 
 The method should enable the risk of property damage with respect to domino effects 
to be analysed, both within a subsystem and between different subsystems.  
 
The risk of property damage with respect to domino effects was analysed both within a 
subsystem and between different subsystems during the case study.  In both cases, the method 
was applied in coherence and the analysis of each chain of events could be performed with a 
straightforward approach.  
 
 The method should enable site specific safety distances either to be established or 
validated with regard to property damage and domino effects.   
 
During the case study it has been validated that the distance between the two subsystems 
analysed is sufficient. Due to that fact, the method is deemed to be applicable when 
establishing site specific safety distances, if used iteratively in the design phase.  
66 
 
  
67 
 
REFERENCE LIST  
Abdolhamidzadeh, B., Abbasi, T., Rashtchian, D. & Abbasi, S.A. (2010). A new method for 
assessing domino effect in chemical process industry. Journal of Hazardous Materials 182, 
416–426.  
 
Abdolhamidzadeh, B., Abbasi, T., Rashtchian, D. & Abbasi, S.A. (2011). Domino effect in 
process-industry – an inventory of past events and identification of some patterns. Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24, 575–593. 
 
Antonioni, G., Spadoni, G. & Cozzani, V. (2009). Application of domino effect quantitative 
risk assessment to an extended industrial area. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries 22. 614-624.  
 
Arbetsmiljöverket (2005). Förebyggande av allvarliga kemikalieolyckor. Arbetsmiljöverkets 
författningssamling, AFS 2005:19. 
 
Baker, W.E., Cox, P.A., Westine, P.S., Kulesz, J.J. & Strehlow, R.A. (1983). Explosion 
Hazards and Evaluation, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
 
Berglund, P.M. & Petersson, G. (1989). Hazardous petrol hydrocarbons from refuelling with 
and without vapour recovery. The Science of the Total Environment 91, 49-57.  
 
Bobbio, A., Portinale, L., Minichino, M. & Ciancamerla, E. (2001). Improving the analysis of 
dependable systems by mapping fault trees into Bayesian networks. Reliability Engineering 
and System Safety 71, 249–260. 
 
CCPS, Center for Chemical Process Safety (1989). Guidelines for Chemical Process 
Quantitative Risk Analysis. AIChE, New York.       
 
CCPS, Center for Chemical Process Safety (1992). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation 
Procedures, 2
nd
 Edn AIChE, New York.  
 
CCPS, Center for Chemical Process Safety (1999). Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of 
Chemical Releases. AIChE, New York.  
 
CCPS, Center for Chemical Process Safety (2012). Guidelines for Engineering Design for 
Process Safety. AIChE, New York.  
 
Commission of the European Communities (1997). Directive 96/82/EC on the control of 
major accident hazards involving dangerous substances. The Official Journal of the European 
Communities, No L 10, pp 13-33.  
 
Cozzani, V. & Salzano, E. (2004a). The quantitative assessment of domino effects caused by 
overpressure. Part I: Probit Models. Journal of Hazardous Materials 107, 67–80. 
 
Cozzani, V. & Salzano, E. (2004b). The quantitative assessment of domino effects caused by 
overpressure. Part II: Case studies. Journal of Hazardous Materials 107, 81–94. 
 
Cozzani, V. & Salzano, E. (2004c). Threshold values for domino effects caused by blast wave 
interaction with process equipment. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries17, 
437–447. 
 
68 
 
Cozzani, V., Gubinelli, G., Antonioni, G., Spadoni, G. & Zanelli, S. (2005). The assessment 
of risk caused by domino effect in quantitative area risk analysis. Journal of Hazardous 
Materials A127, 14–30. 
 
Cozzani, V., Gubinelli, G. & Salzano, E. (2006). Escalation thresholds in the assessment of 
domino accidental events. Journal of Hazardous Materials 129, 1–21. 
 
Darbra, R.M., Palacios, A. & Casal, J. (2010). Domino effect in chemical accidents: main 
features and accident sequences. Journal of Hazardous Materials 183, 565–573. 
 
Davidsson, G., Haeffler, L., Ljundman, B. & Frantzich, H. (2003). Handbok för riskanalys. 
Räddningsverket, Karlstad.  
 
Eisenberg, N.A., Lynch, C.J., Breeding, R.J. (1975). Vulnerability Model: A Simulation 
System for Assessing Damage Resulting from Marine Spills. Rep. CG-D-136-75, Enviro 
Control Inc., Rockville, MD. 
 
Frederickson, A. (2001). The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) method. Retrieved from 
http://www.jlab.org/accel/ssg/safety/lopa.pdf  
 
Gubinelli, G., Zanelli, S. & Cozzani, V. (2004). A simplified model for the assessment of the 
impact probability of fragments. Journal of Hazardous Materials A116, 175–187. 
 
Gubinelli, G. & Cozzani, V. (2009). Assessment of missile hazards: identification of 
reference fragmentation patterns. Journal of Hazardous Materials 163, 1008–1018. 
 
Hauptmanns, U. (2001). A Monte Carlo-based procedure for treating the flight of missiles 
from tank explosions. Probabilistic Engineering Mechanics 16, 307–312. 
 
IEC, International Electrotechnical Comission (1995). International Standard - 
Dependabiliy management part 3. Application guide - section 9, Risk Analysis of 
technological systems. 
 
Kaplan, S & Garrick, B. J. (1981). On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk analysis 1, 11-
27. 
 
Khan, F. I. & Abbasi, S.A. (1998). Techniques and methodologies for risk analysis in 
chemical process industries. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11, 261-
277. 
 
Kirchsteiger, K. (1998). Risk Assessment and Management in the Context of the Seveso II 
Directive. Industrial Safety Series, vol. 6, Elsevier, Amsterdam.  
 
Landucci, G., Gubinelli, G., Antonioni, G. & Cozzani, V. (2009a). The assessment of the 
damage probability of storage tanks in domino events triggered by fire. Accident Analysis and 
Prevention 41, 1206-1215.  
 
Landucci, G., Molag, M., Reinders, J. & Cozzani, V. (2009b). Exerimental and analytical 
investigation of thermal coating effectiveness for 3 m
3 
LPG tanks engulfed by fire. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials 161, 1182-1192.  
 
Lees, F.P. (1996). Loss prevention in process industries, vol. 1–3. Butterworths, London.  
 
69 
 
Liu, A., Wu, C. & Peng, X. (2012). Research on area risk assessment for Chemical Park based 
on domino effect model. Procedia Engineering 45, 47–52. 
 
Mannan, S. (2005). Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, third ed. Elsevier, 
Oxford. 
 
Mingguang, Z. & Juncheng, J. (2008). An improved probit method for assessment of domino 
effect to chemical process equipment caused by overpressure. Journal of Hazardous Material 
158, 280-286.   
 
Nilsson, J. (2003). Introduktion till riskanalysmetoder. Brandteknik, LTH, Lund. 
 
Purple Book (2005). Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment. Directorate General for 
Social Affairs and Employment,The Hague, Netherlands. 
 
Reniers, G.L.L., Dullaert, W., Ale, B.J.M. & Soudan, K. (2005). Developing an external 
domino accident prevention framework: Hazwim. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries 18, 127–138. 
 
Reniers, G. (2010). An external domino effects investment approach to improve crossplant 
safety within chemical clusters. Journal of Hazardous Material 177, 167. 
 
Reniers, G. & Cozzani, V. (2013). Domino Effects in the Process Industries; Modeling, 
Prevention and Managing. Elsevier, Bologna.    
 
Renjith, V.R. & Madhu, G. (2010). Individual and societal risk analysis and mapping of 
human vulnerability to chemical accidents in the vicinity of an industrial area. International 
Journal of Applied Engineering Research 1, 135-148.  
 
Rezaie, K., Amalnik, M.S., Gereie, A., Ostadi B. & Shakhseniaee M. (2007). Using extended 
Monte Carlo simulation method for the improvement of risk management: Consideration of 
relationships between uncertainties. Applied Mathematics and Computation 190, 1492–1501. 
 
RIVM, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment. (2009). Reference Manual 
Bevi Risk Assessments version 3.2 – Introduction. Centre for External Safety, Netherlands. 
 
Summers, A. (2002). Introduction to Layer of Protection Analysis. Retrieved from 
https://www.jlab.org/accel/ssg/safety/LAYER%20OF%20PROTECTION%20ANALYSIS.pd
f 
 
Tugnoli, A., Cozzani, V., Di Padova, A., Barbaresi, T. & Tallone, F. (2011). Mitigation of fire 
damage and escalation by fireproofing: A risk-based strategy. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety 105, 25–35. 
 
Wood, R. (2010). Third Party Risk around airports. Retrieved from 
http://www.aef.org.uk/downloads/AW+Third+Party+Risk+-+revised+Nov2010.pdf . 
 
 
  
70 
 
  
71 
 
APPENDIX A – STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Darbra et al. (2010) has studied the features of 225 domino accidents in process/storage plants 
and in the transportation of hazardous material. Of these accidents 25 % had occurred in The 
European Union, 56 % in Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and the United 
States and 19 % had occurred in the rest of the world. More than 80 % of the accidents 
involving a domino effect occurred in developed countries, which have conditions of process 
plants comparable to Sweden. Other historical analyses have been conducted, Chen et al. 
(2012) is one example but their analysis is more focused on accidents in developing countries 
and therefore the results are not suitable to integrate in the study at hand. Abdolhamidzadeh et 
al. (2011) published an inventory of 224 major process industry accidents involving domino 
effects, where most of the accidents had occurred in process plants and some in 
transportation. Further in this chapter follows a detailed description of the findings in the 
analyses of Darbra et al. (2010) and Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2011).  
 
A.1 Types of hazardous material involved  
Flammable substances are the most common ones involved in major accidents with domino 
events. Looking at Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2011) findings, they concluded that flammable 
substances were associated with 89 % of all domino events. The same fraction was identified 
by Darbra et al. (2010), whom also present a more detailed list of the substances that had been 
most frequently involved in domino events, see table 18. Miscellaneous and toxic substances 
correspond for seven respectively four percent of the substances involved in domino events 
(Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011). 
 
Table  18. The substances most frequently involved in domino events (Darbra et al., 2010). 
Substance Number of accidents % 
LPG 60 26,7 
Oil 25 11,1 
Gasoline 24 10,7 
Naphtha 14 6,2 
Diesel oil 12 5,3 
Toluene 9 4 
Vinyl chloride 9 4 
Ethylene 8 3,6 
Ethylene oxide  7 3,1 
Natural gas 7 3,1 
Chlorine 7 3,1 
Methanol 6 2,7 
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A.2 Origin 
As shown in figure 24, the area in which most domino accident originates from is storage 
facilities, followed by process plants and transportation. The different areas have been divided 
according to the Major Hazardous Incident Data Service database (MHIDAS database), which 
are as following: process, storage, transportation, transfer, commercial and warehouse (Darbra 
et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 24. Origin of domino accidents, accidents in loading/unloading operations are included in Transfer 
(Darbra et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 24 shows that 68 percent of all domino accidents have originated from fixed 
installations and 32 percent from different kind of transportation modes, including transfer. 
Looking at Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2011) results, they have identified that 80 percent of all 
domino accidents have originated from fixed installations and 20 percent have occurred 
during transportation. Readers should note that there is a lack of accuracy regarding pipelines 
being included in transportation or not. This is believed to be one of the main reasons why 
there is such a substantial spread among the results from different authors. Abdolhamidzadeh 
et al. (2011) have also analysed how the distribution among different transportation modes 
looked like, these results are shown in figure 25.     
 
 
Figure 25. Different modes of transportation where domino events have been encountered (Abdolhamidzadeh et 
al., 2011). 
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A.3 Causes  
Darbra et al. (2010) have from a variety of sources, divided according MHIDAS database, 
gathered information regarding the general causes of primary accidents, this information is 
presented in table 19. Readers should note that the total percentages goes beyond 100, this 
because some accidents were triggered by more than one general cause. There is also a lack of 
accuracy regarding accidents triggered by human factors. In the study made by Darbra et al. 
(2010), only accidents with specific references to human error were classified in that category. 
In reality, accidents that in the study have been classified as mechanical failure could very 
well be the consequence of an initial human error. Based on that fact it is likely that the 
percentages for human failure shown in table 19 is lower than it is in reality (ibid.).   
 
Table  19. General causes of the initial event (Darbra et al., 2010). 
Cause Number of events % 
External Events 69 30,7 
Mechanical failure 65 28,9 
Human factor 47 20,9 
Impact failure 40 17,8 
Violent reaction 21 9,3 
Instrument failure 8 3,6 
Upset process condition 5 2,2 
Services failure 3 1,3 
 
A.4 Initiating events and domino sequences 
A critical aspect for improving our understanding of domino effect accidents is to analyse the 
length and the events involved in domino sequences. 53 % of all accidents involved in the 
study by Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2011) had secondary events and 47 % included a tertiary or 
even higher level of escalation. Looking at which accidents that is most likely to trigger one 
or more sequential accidents, it is revealed that explosions are the most frequent cause of 
domino effects (57 %), followed by fires (43 %) (ibid.). Among domino events initiated by 
fires, see figure 26, pool fires were the main type of fire that was involved in the initiation of 
domino accidents.  
 
Figure 26. Types of fires involved in initiating domino effect (Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011) 
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Among the events initiated by an explosion, see figure 27, VCE (Vapor cloud explosion) has 
been the most frequent cause, followed by physical explosion and dust explosion 
(Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 27. Types of explosions involved in initiating domino effect (Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011).  
 
Comparing the different types of fires and explosions, one can see that VCE/VCF are the 
most frequent cause of initiating domino sequences and are followed by pool fires. 
 
By asserting relative probabilities, Darbra et al. (2010) analysed domino sequences by using 
an event tree analysis. The initiating events were divided into four categories: release, fire, 
explosion and gas cloud. The event tree was later redeveloped, now only including fire and 
explosion as the primary events, see figure 28. The event release is often not registered in 
databases and therefore it can be seen as misleading to include that category. Regarding the 
gas cloud; if the gas cloud was made of flammable substances and ignited, it was considered 
an explosion; if the flammable cloud was ignited but did not involve any mechanical effects, 
it was considered a fire; and if it was a toxic non flammable gas cloud it would not cause any 
secondary events (Darbra et al., 2010).  
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Figure 28. Relative probability tree showing the diverse domino effect sequences (Darbra et al., 2010). 
 
Of the 225 accidents studied in by Darbra et al. (2010), 193 involved one domino effect (a 
primary event followed by secondary accidents), whereas 32 involved at least two domino 
effects. As following these results, the ratio between first-level and second-level domino 
effects sequences can be calculated to 6, which is significantly higher than Abdolhamidzadeh 
et al. (2011) ratio of 1,13. If the release factor were to be included in the relative probability 
tree the ratio would be 1,4, which is much closer with values given by other authors. The 
difference could also be traced back to the lack of accuracy in the description of accidents in 
databases, which often leads to different interpretations (Reniers & Cozzani, 2013). Readers 
should note that the physical effect known as fragment projection, which have been defined as 
an escalation vector is included in the percentages the explosion category. This is based on the 
fact that flying missiles are hard to correlate to any specific accident when interpreting data 
from historical domino events.   
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